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I. INTRODUCTION
Until recently, a conflict existed among the United States courts of
appeals over the meaning of this portion of the federal in forma pauperis
statute:' "The court may request an attorney to represent any such per-
son unable to employ counsel."'2 Some courts read the statute as em-
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1988). The principal case construing § 1915 is Adkins
v. Dupont. See 335 U.S. 331 (1948). For general discussions of § 1915, see Catz
& Guyer, Federal In Forma Pauperis Litigation: In Search of Judicial Standards, 31
RUrGERS L. REV. 655 (1978); Feldman, Indigents in the Federal Courts: The In
Forma Pauperis Statute--Equality and Frivolity, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 413 (1985).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1988). Subsection (d) provides in whole: "The
(1175)
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powering federal courts to appoint an attorney to represent indigent
civil clients.3 Others held that a federal court could not appoint an at-
torney, but only request that the attorney represent the indigent.4 The
Supreme Court resolved the issue in Mallard v. United States District
Court,5 holding that section 1915(d) does not authorize a federal court to
require an unwilling attorney to represent an indigent litigant in a civil
case.
6
In Mallard, the Court had an opportunity to contribute to the de-
bate over the force of an attorney's ethical obligation to provide pro bono
publico services. 7 Instead, the Court was careful to decide the case nar-
rowly and thereby to avoid the broader policy issues.8 After sketching
the broad parameters of the debate over an attorney's pro bono obliga-
tion,9 and situating the facts of Mallard within that context,10 this Note
court may request an attorney to represent any such person unable to employ
counsel and may dismiss the case if the allegation of poverty is untrue, or if
satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious." Id.
3. Hodge v. Police Officers, 802 F.2d 58, 60 (2d Cir. 1986) ("The authority
for a district judge to appoint counsel for indigents in civil cases comes from 28
U.S.C. § 1915(d)."); Whisenant v. Yuam, 739 F.2d 160, 163 n.3 (4th Cir. 1984)
("Although the statute says that a court may 'request' an attorney... the cases
construe the statute as authorizing a court to 'appoint' counsel."); Ulmer v.
Chancellor, 691 F.2d 209, 213 (5th Cir. 1982) ("A federal court has discretion
[under § 1915(d)] to appoint counsel if doing so would advance the proper ad-
ministration ofjustice ...."); McKeever v. Israel, 689 F.2d 1315, 1319 (7th Cir.
1982) (2-1 decision) (Bauer, Posner and Larson, JJ.) ("[T]he vast weight of au-
thority . . .demonstrates that the power of a court to provide counsel under
section 1915(d) is commonly referred to as a power to 'appoint.' "); Peterson v.
Nadler, 452 F.2d 754, 757 (8th Cir. 1971) (section 1915(d) gives court "express
authority ... to appoint counsel in civil cases").
4. United States v. 30.64 Acres of Land, 795 F.2d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 1986)
("[section] 1915(d) does not authorize appointment of counsel"); Caruth v.
Pinkney, 683 F.2d 1044, 1049 (7th Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (Pell, Wood and Cof-
fey, J.) ("[A] court has the authority only to request an attorney to represent an
indigent, not to require him to do so.") (emphasis in original), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1214 (1983); Reid v. Charney, 235 F.2d 47, 47 (6th Cir. 1956) ("IT]he
court in a civil case has the statutory power only to 'request an attorney to repre-
sent' [an indigent].").
5. 109 S. Ct. 1.814 (1989) (5-4 decision).
6. See id. at 1823.
7. See Montague, Take This Case for Free ... or Else, A.B.A. J., May 1989, at 54.
Mr. Montague noted that "the justices could shed new light on several major
public-policy issues involving society's obligation to provide access to the courts
for all citizens, and the bar's ethical duty to ensure that access." Id. at 54. Fur-
ther, he suggested that "[u]nderlying the specific legal arguments in the Mallard
case are fundamental issues of public policy and private responsibility." Id. at
58.
8. For a discussion of the narrowness of the opinion, see infra note 85.
9. For a discussion of the debate on an attorney's pro bono obligation, see
infra notes 16-39 and accompanying text.
10. For a discussion of the facts of Mallard, see infra notes 71-81 and accom-
panying text.
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examines the Court's decision in the case.11 Because interpretation of
section 1915(d) was dispositive, 12 particularly close attention will be
given to the Court's interpretive methodology.13 Despite the suggested
weaknesses of that methodology,14 the result of the case was correct and
does not greatly lessen the viability of section 1915(d). 15
II. BACKGROUND
A. Mandatory Pro Bono
Historically, it has rarely been controversial, at least within the legal
community, to regard pro bono service with professional pride and as
distinguishing the practice of law from other pursuits.16 The existence
of the obligation to perform pro bono work has long been recognized, 17
arguably without justification,' 8 but it was only recently that its sub-
11. For a discussion of Justice Brennan's majority opinion, see infra notes
82-125 and accompanying text. For a discussion of Justice Kennedy's concur-
ring opinion, see infra notes 126-28 and accompanying text. For a discussion of
Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion, see infra notes 129-57 and accompanying
text.
12. See Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1822 ("[O]ur decision today is limited to inter-
preting § 1915(d).").
13. For a discussion of the Court's interpretive methodology, see infra
notes 88-115 and accompanying text.
14. For a critical discussion of the Court's interpretation of § 1915(d), see
infra notes 158-265 and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of the continuing viability of § 1915(d), see infra notes
333-34 and accompanying text.
16. See R. POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIO.urrY TO MODERN TIMES 5 (1953)
(non-profit motivations distinguish profession from business pursuit); Brun-
dage, Legal Aid for the Poor and the Professionalization of Law in the Middle Ages, 9 J.
LEGAL HIST. 169, 175 (1988) ("[M]edieval lawyers regarded it as one mark of
their superiority to other craftsmen that they furnished their specialized skills to
economically and socially disadvantaged persons without compensation."); cf.
ABA Lawyer's Pledge of Professionalism ("I will remember that the practice of law is
first and foremost a profession, and I will subordinate business concerns to pro-
fessionalism concerns."), reprinted in Greengard, Lawyer Discipline Today, BARRIS-
TER, Spring 1990, at 11, 12.
17. See R. SMrrH, JusTICE AND THE POOR 230 (2d ed. 1921) (theory of law-
yer's obligation to poor "is not peculiar to our law; it is characteristic of the
lawyer's position in all civilized communities, and there is evidence that it has
been recognized since the earliest times.") (footnote omitted); Maguire, Poverty
and Civil Litigation, 36 HARV. L. REV. 361, 385 (1923) (uncompensated service
was "noble tradition of the early Roman bar"). The Ninth Circuit adopted these
historical views in a seminal decision that rejected an attorney's constitutional
challenge to being appointed under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to represent an indigent
without just compensation for his services. United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d
633, 636 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 978 (1966).
18. Recent scholarship regards with suspicion claims to historical justifica-
tions for mandatory uncompensated service. See generally Shapiro, The Enigma of
the Lawyer's Duty to Serve, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV. 735 (1980). Based on a thorough
historical investigation, Professor Shapiro concluded that "[t]o justify coerced,
uncompensated legal services on the basis of a firm tradition in England and the
United States is to read into that tradition a story that is not there." Id. at 753.
3
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stance inspired heated debate. 19
In 1975, the American Bar Association (ABA) fueled the contro-
versy when it began to take seriously the idea of requiring its members
to perform public interest legal service in exchange for little or no com-
pensation. 20 Attention to the notion of a mandatory pro bono require-
ment arose in the context of the movement to replace the 1969 Model
Code of Professional Responsibility2 ' with the Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct. 22 At the same time, other legal organizations made
Professor Shapiro's conclusion was quoted with approval in Mallard. See Mallard,
109 S. Ct. at 1819.
Strong claims to an historical justification for uncompensated service ac-
companied the rise of the Legal Aid movement early in the twentieth century.
See R. SMITH, supra note 17, at 230. Smith, a member of the Massachusetts bar,
was a driving force in the movement. His classic work,Justice and the Poor, is "the
most thorough and excellent history of [its] beginnings." Maffei & Latham, Pri-
vate Bar Involvement in the Development of Pro Bono Legal Services: The Massachusetts
Experience, 73 MASS. L. REV. 153, 154 n.5 (1988). Thus, although Smith claimed
that the obligation to represent the poor without charge had historical support,
he did so in a discussion of "the widespread failure of the legal system to make
inexpensive legal services available to the poor." Id. at 155. Indeed, immedi-
ately after his claim of historical justification for the obligation, Smith himself
remarked that "[i]n civil cases.... the power [of a court to compel an attorney to
represent indigents] has fallen into such disuse that its existence is forgotten or
denied." R. SMITH, supra note 17, at 230.
19. It has been suggested that the notion of a mandatory duty to perform
pro bono work "received its first serious articulation" with the publication of F.
MARKS, K. LESWING & B. FORTINSKY, THE LAWYER, THE PUBLIC & PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY (1972). Christensen, Lawyer's Pro Bono Publico Responsibility, 1981
AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1, 3 n.5.
20. See ABA House of Delegates Resolution on Public Interest Legal Serv-
ices (August, 1975) (provision of such service is "basic professional responsibil-
ity"). One proposed draft of the new Rules stated that "[a] lawyer shall render
unpaid public interest legal service." Shapiro, supra note 18, at 736 n.6 (citing
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.1 (Discussion Draft 1980)).
21. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1969) [hereinafter
MODEL CODE]. The 1969 Model Code had replaced the Canons of Professional
Ethics, originally adopted by the ABA in 1908.
The ABA adopted the Model Code in recognition of the fact that lawyers
require "an understanding . . .of their relationship with and function in our
legal system." Id. at preamble (footnote omitted); cf. id. at preliminary statement
("In furtherance of the principles stated in the Preamble, the [ABA] has promul-
gated this Code .... ). The Model Code consists of canons, ethical considera-
tions and disciplinary rules. "The Canons are statements of axiomatic norms,
expressing in general terms the standards of professional conduct .... The
Ethical Considerations are aspirational in character and represent the objectives
toward which every member of the profession should strive .... The Discipli-
nary Rules, unlike the Ethical Considerations, are mandatory in character." Id.
22. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983) [hereinafter MODEL
RULES]. The Model Rules were drafted by the American Bar Association Com-
mission on Evaluation of Professional Standards, otherwise known as the Kutak
Commission. The ABA eventually adopted the Rules in August, 1983. SE-
LECTED STATUTES, RULES & STANDARDS ON THE LEGAL PROFESSION 111 (West
1989).
The Rules are not effective in a jurisdiction until they are adopted by the
4
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similar proposals for recognition of a mandatory obligation.23 These
suggestions prompted prodigious publication of arguments both for 2 4
and against2 5 a mandatory obligation.
When the dust settled, the ABA had abandoned the idea of a
mandatory pro bono obligation. 26 The ABA eventually drafted Model
Rule 6.1 to read:
A lawyer should render public interest legal service. A law-
yer may discharge this responsibility [i] by providing profes-
sional services at no fee or a reduced fee to persons of limited
means or to public service or charitable groups or organiza-
tions, [ii] by service in activities for improving the law, the legal
system or the legal profession, and [iii] by financial support for
organizations that provide legal service to persons of limited
means.
27
To further stress its hortative nature, a comment states that the Rule "is
not intended to be enforced through disciplinary process." '28
authority responsible for regulating the legal profession. Id. In Pennsylvania,
the Model Rules superseded the Code effective April 1, 1988. Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania Order No. 412 (Oct. 6, 1987), reprinted in New Rules of Professional
Conduct, at x (Pa. B. Inst. 1988).
23. See Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York, Special Comm. on the
Lawyer's Pro Bono Obligations, Toward a Mandatory Contribution of Public Service
Practice by Every Lawyer 11 (1980) ("Every lawyer shall devote a significant por-
tion of his or her professional time each year to public service practice."); Eisen-
berg, NLADA on the ABA Model Rules, 37 NLADA BRIEFCASE 49 (1980)
(proposing National Legal Aid and Defender's Association's alternative: "A law-
yer shall render unpaid public interest service."). The proposals are reprinted
at appendices C and D, respectively, in Spencer, Mandatory Public Service for Attor-
neys: A Proposal for the Future, 12 Sw. U.L. REV. 493, 524-25 (1981).
24. See, e.g., Rosenfeld, Mandatory Pro Bono: Historical and Constitutional Per-
spectives, 2 CARDOZO L. REV. 255 (1981); Spencer, supra note 23, at 493; Torres &
Stansky, In Support of a Mandatory Public Service Obligation, 29 EMORY L.J. 997
(1980); Note, Court Appointment of Attorneys in Civil Cases: The Constitutionality of
Uncompensated Legal Service, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 366 (1981).
25. See, e.g., Humbach, Serving the Public Interest: An Overstated Objective, 65
A.B.A. J. 564 (1979); Shapiro, supra note 18; see also, Comment, The Uncompen-
sated Appointed Counsel System: A Constitutional and Social Transgression, 60 Ky. LJ.
710 (1972).
26. See Slonim, Kutak Panel Report: No Mandatory Pro Bono, 67 A.B.A. J. 33
(1981) (reporting that Kutak Commission dropped requirement of pro bono);
Slonim, Commission Votes Down Pro Bono Reporting, 66 A.B.A.J. 951 (1980) (report-
ing that Kutak Commission dropped requirement of annual report of service).
27. MODEL RULES, supra note 22, Rule 6.1 (emphasis and numbering ad-
ded). For a detailed account of the various proposed drafts of the Rule, and an
appreciation of how it was weakened as it evolved, see Shapiro, supra note 18, at
736-38, and Rosenfeld, supra note 24, at 260-61.
28. MODEL RULES, supra note 22, Rule 6.1, at comment. "The Comment
accompanying each Rule explains and illustrates the meaning and purpose of
the Rule." Id. at scope.
For the results of a thorough study of lawyer disciplinary agencies, see ABA
Center for Professional Responsibility and the Standing Comm. of Professional
1990] NOTE 1179
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Following the adoption of Rule 6.1, debate over the notion of a
mandatory pro bono obligation temporarily subsided.29 Within four
years, however, the issue was once again "hot-and getting hotter."30
With political ill-winds blowing against the Legal Services Corpora-
tion,31 which distributes federal money to programs assisting the poor,
Discipline, Survey on Lawyer Discipline Systems (Dec. 1988) (average of one com-
plaint per 10 licensed attorneys; 60% of complaints investigated; 7% of investi-
gated claims result in private or public sanctions). For a discussion of due
process problems in the context of disciplinary rules, see Grossman, Inherent Ju-
dicial Power and Disciplinary Due Process, 18 SETON HALL L. REV. 541 (1988).
29. Although the debate subsided, the issue still plagued the profession.
See Miskiewicz, Mandatoy Pro Bono Won't Disappear, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 23, 1987, at
1,8.
30. Graham, Mandatory Pro Bono: The Shape of Things to Come?, A.B.A.J., Dec.
1987, at 62, 65.
31. The Legal Services Corporation (LSC) came under heavy attack from
former President Reagan's administration. In seven of his eight budget propos-
als, President Reagan failed to provide funds for LSC. Barnes, Right Cross, THE
NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 16, 1989, at 10. Congress continued to allocate funds,
ranging from $321 million in 1980 to a low of $241 million in 1981. Comment,
Mandatory Pro Bono: The Path to Equal Justice, 16 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 355, 359
n.29 (1989) [hereinafter Path to Equal Justice]. In his last year of office, President
Reagan requested funding of $250 million for LSC. Neal, Legal Services Corp.
Turmoil, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1988, at 17. In 1989, LSC received $300 million.
Barnes, supra, at 10.
Unable to win a war of attrition, Reagan-appointed LSC Chairman W. Clark
Durant III sought to dismantle the Corporation. Lauter, LSC Head Suggests Abol-
ishing Agency, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 23, 1987, at 2. Durant later forced LSC President
John Bayly Jr. out of his position and replaced him with a "more staunch sup-
porter of... his goal of dismantling the LSC." Neal, supra, at 17. Durant ended
his tenure faced with allegations of misuse of LSC funds. Id. For a discussion of
President Reagan's attack on LSC, see Caplan, Understanding the Controversy over
the Legal Services Corporation, 28 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 583 (1983). For criticisms of
LSC, see Phillips, Legal Services and the Public Interest, 8 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'v
355 (1985) (proposing abolishment); Comment, Pulling the Reins on Legal Services
Lobbying, 9 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 203 (1986) (advocating tighter congressional
control).
Under President Bush, LSC continues to be a political battleground. Un-
able to kill LSC under President Reagan, conservative groups adopted a
"fallback provision" in the summer of 1988. Barnes, supra, at 10. Under the
auspices of the newly-formed Legal Services Reform Coalition (LSRC), these
groups sought "to put conservatives on the LSC board.., and sharper limits on
what LSC attorneys can do for clients." Id. at 11. White House Chief of Staff
John Sununu selected M. Caldwell Butler to replace Durant, LSC Chairman
under President Reagan. Id. at 10. Sununu won reluctant approval of Butler
from conservative groups. Id. at 11. In a September 1988 meeting with LSRC
members, however, Butler replied affirmatively to the question whether "a legal
services lawyer should sue a hospital that refused to provide a Medicaid abortion
to a poor person." Id. at 12. The group rejected Butler, "Sununu acquiesced,
and [he was] back to square one in finding a new LSC chairman." Id. at 11. In
January 1990, President'Bush appointed nine new directors (out of 11 total)
"just hours before Congress went back into session.... [thus making] it possible
for the new board members to take office immediately rather than having to
await Senate confirmation." Barrett, Nine Directors of Legal Agency Appointed by
Bush, Wall St. J., Jan. 24, 1990, at B6, col. 4.
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the pressure was on to find a private solution to the problem of the un-
met legal needs of the poor.3 2 Attempted solutions have taken a variety
of forms, including local bar requirements,"3 state bar recommenda-
tions,34 legislative inquiries,3 5 court rules3 6 and even requirements of
service as a condition for graduation from law school.3 7 The ABA reen-
32. For a recent summary of the level of need, see Path to Equal Justice, supra
note 31, at 357-60 ("Although the exact quantification of the legal needs of the
poor is not clear, it is obvious that they are vast."); see also Born, Serving the Poor,
A.B.A. J., Mar. 1988, at 144 (over 93% of legal needs of poor go unserved).
33. By the end of 1987, seven local bar associations had mandatory pro
bono requirements for their members. Graham, supra note 30, at 62 (Orange,
Leon and Palm Beach Counties, Fla.; Bryan and Athens Counties, Tex.; DuPage
County, Ill.; Eau Claire County, Wisc.). The Boston and Chicago Bar Associa-
tions adopted resolutions to encourage their members to perform pro bono
work. Path to Equal Justice, supra note 31, at 364 n.73.
34. See Wall St.J., Feb. 7, 1990, at B7, col. 2. The Colorado bar has recom-
mended that large Denver firms send their lawyers to rural towns to provide the
poor with pro bono services. The bar is optimistic that firms will participate, but
says "cost is a hurdle." Id. at col. 4. Davis, Graham & Stubbs, the first firm to
provide an attorney, estimates that it may lose $60,000, the amount the attorney
would otherwise bill in the four months she is away from Denver. Id. For a
study of large firms' efforts to provide pro bono services, see Barr, Doers and
Talkers, AM. Law., July-Aug. 1990, at 51.
The Connecticut Bar Association adopted a resolution to encourage its
members to perform pro bono work. Path to Equal Justice, supra note 31, at 364
n.73. The Michigan Bar has also developed a proposed voluntary participation
standard. Mucciante & Lamping, Pro Bono in Michigan, 67 MICH. B.J. 1114
(1988). A task force appointed by Chief Judge Sol Wachtler of the New York
Court of Appeals reported that the New York bar should require 20 hours of
service. See Mandatory Pro Bono, A.B.A.J., Oct. 1989, at 52 (excerpting report of
Committee to Improve the Availability of Legal Services). ChiefJudge Wachtler
declined to adopt the committee's recommendation, but warned that if the
needs of the poor were not met by voluntary efforts by 1992, he would impose a
mandatory program. Sack, Judge Presses New York Bar to Help Poor, N.Y. Times,
May 2, 1990, at B1, col. 4; cf. Marcotte, Pro Bono Recruits, A.B.A.J., Feb. 1990, at
25 (Maryland bar sent letter signed by chief judge of highest court to all attor-
neys in state urging them to take at least one pro bono case per year).
35. Oregon and Washington both studied the issue of requiring public ser-
vice, but neither adopted the idea. Graham, supra note 30, at 62.
36. During the years 1982-1987, district courts in eight federal jurisdictions
adopted local rules or general orders providing for mandatory service in civil
cases. Id. (Eastern and Western Dists. of Ark.; Northern and Central Dists. of
Ill.; Northern and Southern Dists. of Iowa; Dist. of Conn.; San Antonio Div. of
Western Dist. of Tex.). After Mallard, the viability of these rules, at least those
that draw their authority from § 1915, is questionable.
37. Tulane Law School was the first to adopt this requirement of public
service in order to graduate. Pro Bono Makes the Grade at Tulane, STUDENT LAW.,
Feb. 1988, at 7 (20 hours of service for indigents required for graduation). The
University of Pennsylvania Law School was the second. Lambert, Penn Students
Face Pro Bono Requirement, STUDENT LAW., Sept. 1989, at 53 (70 hours required).
Florida State University and Valparaiso University recently joined the move-
ment, and several schools, including Georgetown, are studying the idea. Har-
old, Dilemmas, STUDENT LAw., Jan. 1990, at 11. In August 1989, the Law Student
Division (LSD) of the ABA "soundly defeated a proposal endorsing mandatory
pro bono programs." Id. In August 1990, however, the LSD passed Resolution
7
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tered the controversy in 1987 with the publication of its first editorial in
five years, calling for fifty hours of pro bono service a year.3 8 One year
later, the ABA adopted the fifty hour minimum as its official policy.3 9
B. Court Appointed Representation
Under Model Rule 6.1, unpaid representation of clients in court
proceedings is only one of the methods by which an attorney may dis-
charge her pro bono obligation. It is also a method with a unique char-
acteristic, for, unlike performance of pro bono work by, for example,
serving on the board of directors of a church, performance in the court-
room opens the opportunity for judicial participation. A court's most
straightforward manner of ensuring that an attorney performs pro bono
work is to appoint the attorney to represent a client appearing in the
court. Some attorneys have objected to what they perceive as an intru-
sion on the exercise of their professional skills. The discourse in most
modern cases addressing attorneys' objections has been carried out
within certain well-defined boundaries. This Note sketches those
boundaries and demonstrates how courts have maneuvered within them.
1. General Boundaries
Courts have described attorneys in terms of the following dichoto-
mies: willing/unwilling and compensated/uncompensated. 40 Similarly,
discussion of a litigant's status may also be described in terms of certain
dichotomies: plaintiff/defendant, civil/criminal, indigent/nonindigent
90-14, which "encourages" law schools to establish public service requirements
for graduation. Lambert, Division Makes a Pro Bono Link, STUDENT LAW., Oct.
1990, at 54.
38. 50 Hours for the Poor, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1987, at 55. The editorial was co-
published in the Journal of the American Medical Association. See 50 Hours for the Poor,
258J. A.M.A. 3157 (1987). The editorial stated that "all doctors and all lawyers
. .. should contribute a significant percentage of their total professional efforts
without expectation of financial remuneration" and that "50 hours a year ... is
an appropriate minimum amount." 50 Hours for the Poor, A.B.A.J., Dec. 1987, at
55. Taking the message to heart, the Atlanta law firm of Smith, Gambrell &
Russell recently undertook a joint effort with one of its clients, the American
Academy of Facial Plastic and Reconstructive Surgery (AAFPRS). Klages, MDs,
Lawyers Join for Pro Bono, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1989, at 23. The collaborative effort
makes the services of plastic surgeons available "to the poor who are unem-
ployed or unemployable because of facial deformities." Id. Smith, Gambrell &
Russell will draw up the necessary legal documents. Id.
39. Marcotte, Pro Bono Policy Passed, A.B.A.J., Oct. 1988, at 140. The reso-
lution was adopted by the ABA House of Delegates without opposition. It pro-
vides: "Lawyers should devote at least 50 hours to pro bono and other public
service activities that serve those in need, improve the law, the legal system, or
the legal profession." Id. (emphasis added).
40. For purposes of this section, "compensated" means compensated by
the litigant. Thus, an "uncompensated" attorney might receive something for
his services, but the compensation will not come from the litigant.
1182
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and deserving/undeserving. 4 1 A full description of the problem of at-
torneys appointed to represent clients must combine the attorney and
the litigant. For example, a description of a particular scenario within
these boundaries might be "an unwilling, uncompensated attorney and
a civil, indigent, undeserving plaintiff." These restrictions yield a man-
ageable playing-field for discussion.4 2 The following examples illustrate
the ways of thinking about the problem within the suggested
boundaries.
The simplest scenario involves a "nonindigent" litigant. This liti-
gant, regardless of the other three litigant-dichotomies, simply has the
ability to purchase representation and will enter into a private arrange-
ment with an attorney. 43 Another possible scenario involves the "plain-
tiff and criminal" litigant, in other words, the state. The attorney here is
the state prosecutor, who is "willing and compensated"-willing, be-
cause he chose to work for the prosecutor's office; compensated, be-
cause the job pays a salary.
A slightly more difficult scenario involves the "defendant and crimi-
nal" litigant. The Supreme Court has held that this litigant has a consti-
tutional right to counsel under the sixth amendment. 44 Because of the
41. For purposes of this section, "deserving" means that an attorney would
assess the litigant's case as either likely to succeed on the merits or worth devot-
ing time to for any other reason. Thus, a litigant may be "undeserving" even if
she has suffered a legal wrong.
42. The playing-field is manageable, yet still large. Within the proposed
boundaries, there are 64 possible attorney-litigant scenarios. This number is
arrived at by determining the number of "possible attorneys" and the number of
"possible litigants," and then multiplying the numbers to yield the number of
possible attorney-litigant groupings.
For x variables, each of which can have n values, nx represents the number
that exhausts all of the possible combinations. For example, description of an
attorney is limited to two dichotomies (that is, two variables). The dichotomies
may assume two values. Thus, the number of "possible attorneys" is 22, or four:
(i) a willing, compensated attorney, (ii) a willing, uncompensated attorney, (iii)
an unwilling, compensated attorney and (iv) an unwilling, uncompensated attor-
ney. Similarly, description of a litigant is limited to four dichotomies, each of
which may assume two values. Without listing them all, the formula above yields
the inference that the number of "possible litigants" is 2', or 16.
The final step in arriving at the number of possible attorney-litigant scena-
rios is to multiply the number of attorneys, four, by the number of litigants, 16,
the result of which is 64.
43. The notion that the litigant will be able to purchase representation
rests, obviously, on certain economic assumptions. The "free market" approach
to the delivery of legal services is well defended in Fried, The Lawyer as Friend:
The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relationship, 85 YALE LJ. 1060 (1976).
According to Mr. Fried, "[t]he lawyer's liberty . . . to take up or decline what
clients he will is an aspect of the moral liberty of self to enter into personal
relations, freely." Id. at 1078. It has also been argued that the "laissez-faire
ideal" is one of "five ideas of primary importance" embodied in the ABA Model
Code of Professional Responsibility. Penegar, The Five Pillars of Professionalism,
49 U. Prrr. L. REV. 307, 310, 312-22 (1988).
44. The sixth amendment provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
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recognition of that constitutional right, it may be that wherever these
two elements are present, the litigant should also be described as "de-
serving." Initially, much attention was given to identifying the sub-
stance of the right to counsel. 4 5 It was also necessary, however, to
address the satisfaction of the right-if a defendant has a right to coun-
sel, then the correlative duty to assist the defendant must extend to
someone.
4 6
This necessity raised, at least potentially, the problem of the "un-
willing and uncompensated" attorney. But the "uncompensated" as-
pect of the scenario was avoided by the general availability of funds for
public defenders. 4 7 Likewise, the "unwilling" aspect was circumvented
accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the Assistance of counsel for his de-
fence." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. Once thought to guarantee only the assistance
of the accused's own counsel, it has come to include the right to court-appointed
counsel for indigent defendants. See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938)
(right to assigned counsel in all federal cases where defendant could not afford
one); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (right to court-appointed counsel in
capital case). This right was held applicable to state trials under the fourteenth
amendment in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
45. After Gideon, the Supreme Court decided a series of cases defining the
right. See generally Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (defendant accused
of misdemeanor has right to counsel if imprisonment is real possibility); Gilbert
v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) (right to counsel extends to police lineup); In
re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (counsel must be provided in juvenile proceedings
which may result in commitment to institution if child and parents are unable to
afford attorney); White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963) (right to counsel ex-
tends to preliminary hearing); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (right
to counsel extends to first appeal from criminal conviction which is normally
given by state as matter of right). The Supreme Court has also held that the
sixth amendment guarantees to a defendant in a state criminal trial the right to
proceed without counsel when he voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so.
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
46. It does not follow from a particular defendant's right to assistance of
counsel that the correlative duty to provide assistance extends to any attorney
individually. The duty may, for example, be that of the collective legal commu-
nity, or even of society in general. Historically, the duty was assumed by the
church, which had jurisdiction over personae miserabiles ("miserable persons"), in-
cluding the poor, widows and orphans. See H. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION
222 (1983). The partial secularization of this duty came about through in-
structing the laity, including corporate guilds, that "alms bought them merit and
a foothold in Heaven." B. TUCHMAN, A DISTATrr MIRROR 35 (1978).
47. Contemporary with the recognition of the right to counsel in Gideon was
the recognition that some source of financing was necessary if the right were to
have any substance. REPORT OF THE ATr'Y GEN.'S COMM. ON POVERTY AND THE
ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 41-42 (1963) ("[A] system of justice that
attempts ... to meet the needs of the financially incapacitated accused through
primary or exclusive reliance on the uncompensated services of counsel will
prove unsuccessful and inadequate.") Shortly thereafter, both private and gov-
ernment funds were directed to public defenders. In 1964, the Ford Foundation
created the National Defender Project and donated six million dollars over the
next five years to the National Legal Aid and Defender Association. Serpe, Pub-
lic Defenders, CASE & COM., Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 27, 28. Also in 1964, Congress
allocated money to attorneys appointed to represent indigent defendants with
1184 [Vol. 35: p. 1175
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by the general assumption that it is within a court's power to compel the
attorney to serve in a criminal case; thus the attorney's "will" is irrele-
vant.4 8 Recent state court decisions, however, have brought into ques-
tion the earlier treatment of both the "uncompensated" and the
"unwilling" variables in the context of criminal defendants. 49
The possibility of reconsidering the characterization of a particular
litigant-attorney scenario indicates that, although clear boundaries may
define the universe of discourse, there are no definite criteria to fix a
scenario at a determinate point within that universe. The fluidity of de-
scription is most conspicuous in what is hereinafter referred to as "the
prima facie case"-one that involves an indigent civil plaintiff and an
unwilling, uncompensated attorney. Parties on both sides of the issue
readily exploit the fluidity of description to justify their respective posi-
tions. Faced with the prima facie case, a court must decide either (i) to
recharacterize the case by adjusting one or more of the variables, thus
refusing to consider the case as presented and simplifying the task of
justification, or (ii) to resist or ignore the indeterminacy of the descrip-
tion and to accept the prima facie characterization of the case. Courts
that take the first route tend to condone appointment, while courts opt-
ing for the second tend to find in favor of the attorney.
2. Courts That Uphold Appointment
Courts that recharacterize the scenario have various options avail-
able. Few cases turn on recharacterization of the dichotomies that de-
scribe a litigant, because, with the exception of the
deserving/undeserving dichotomy, 50 there is little opportunity for ad-
the passage of the CriminalJustice Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-455, 78 Stat. 552
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1988)).
48. If a court has the power to appoint an attorney, then the relevant in-
quiry is whether the court thinks it appropriate that the defendant be repre-
sented by a particular attorney, not whether the particular attorney thinks so.
The threshold question, however, is whether the court indeed has the power to
appoint counsel.
49. In 1980, Professor Shapiro counted 34 states that had addressed the
issue of whether the private bar was under an enforceable duty to provide un-
compensated defense services. Of those, 18 imposed an unqualified duty. Sha-
piro, supra note 18, at 756. Recent state court decisions have examined the
problem of the "uncompensated" attorney appointed to represent a criminal
defendant, and the majority is now 18-16 against an unqualified duty. See De-
Lisio v. Alaska Superior Court, 740 P.2d 437 (Alaska 1987) (private attorney
may not be compelled to represent indigent criminal defendant without just
compensation); State ex rel. Stephan v. Smith, 747 P.2d 816 (Kan. 1987) (state
has obligation to compensate attorneys appointed to represent indigent criminal
defendants). For a discussion of the effect of Mallard on the issue at the federal
level, see infra note 162.
50. Rarely does a case turn on recharacterizing an undeserving litigant as
deserving. Nevertheless, the struggle over delimiting this aspect plays an impor-
tant role at the more general policy level. For example, our society has statuto-
rily characterized as deserving and provided counsel to civil rights litigants, who
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justment. 51 Instead, most cases involve the two dichotomies that de-
scribe an attorney, since they afford the most flexibility. Where the
willing/unwilling dichotomy is addressed, the legal issue generally is the
validity of the appointment process itself. The court that upholds the
appointment will either ignore the attorney's will or redescribe an un-
willing attorney as willing. On the other hand, where the compen-
sated/uncompensated dichotomy is at stake, the concomitant legal issue
is whether a "taking" has occurred. The court that finds no "taking"
either will find that the attorney has, in a sense, "given," or the court
will redescribe an uncompensated attorney as compensated.
Recharacterization of the willing/unwilling dichotomy takes two
forms. First, a court may regard the attorney's will as irrelevant. This is
accomplished by (a) focusing on the court's power to compel service,5 2
or (b) focusing on the attorney's ethical or professional obligation. 55
Second, even where a court considers the attorney's will, it nonetheless
may (a) find that the attorney is an "officer of the court," thereby subor-
dinating the attorney's will to the court's, 5 4 or (b) find "implied con-
in the "free market" once may have been deemed undeserving and thus unable
to procure representation. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352,
§ 204(a), 78 Stat. 241, 244 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(a)
(1988)) (appoint counsel to civil rights plaintiff seeking injunction); Civil Rights
Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 706(e), 78 Stat. 241, 260 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (1988)) (appoint counsel to Title VII
plaintiff). Where this policy determination is made, however, funds are usually
made available to pay counsel.
51. Some commentators have struggled to recast the civil/criminal litigant
dichotomy. See Leubsdorf, Constitutional Civil Procedure, 63 TEx. L. REV. 579
(1984) (constitutional principles governing criminal cases should apply equally
to civil litigation); Note, The Indigent's Right to Counsel in Civil Cases, 76 YALE L.J.
545 (1967) (suggests incremental approach to development of right to counsel
for both plaintiffs and defendants in civil cases by analogy to development in
criminal cases). A similar argument has been addressed to the distinction be-
tween the "right" to counsel in criminal proceedings and the "privilege" of hav-
ing counsel in civil proceedings. See Catz & Guyer, supra note 1, at 662-63
(right/privilege dichotomy should be abandoned).
52. See Exparte Dibble, 279 S.C. 592, 310 S.E.2d 440 (Ct. App. 1983) (court
has inherent power to appoint counsel, without compensation, to represent indi-
gent litigant in civil case in which appointment is neither constitutional nor stat-
utory right but nonetheless is necessary to render justice).
53. See Payne v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 908, 920 n.6, 132 Cal. Rptr.
405, 414 n.6, 553 P.2d 565, 574 n.6 (1976) (attorneys must provide uncompen-
sated service in civil cases in accordance with duty not to reject cause of defense-
less or oppressed); In re Romano, 109 Misc. 2d 99, 103, 438 N.Y.S.2d 967, 970(Sur. Ct. 1981) (Code of Professional Responsibility requires bar members to
respond to public need for uncompensated service and court may require repre-
sentation of indigent civil plaintiff).
54. See Bartlett v. Kitchin, 76 Misc. 2d 1087, 352 N.Y.S.2d 110 (Sup. Ct.
1973) (as officer of court, attorney's responsibility to provide uncompensated
service to indigent criminal defendants applied in civil matrimonial proceeding).
For disparate views on the "officer of the court" approach, compare Gaetke,
Lawyers as Officers of the Court, 42 VAND. L. REV. 39 (1989) (characterization is
"vacuous and unduly self-laudatory" and should be invigorated) with Martineau,
1186 [Vol. 35: p. 1175
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sent" by the attorney, thereby characterizing him as willing. 5 5
Recharacterization of the compensated/uncompensated dichotomy
also takes two forms. First, a court may find that the attorney, rather
than having anything "taken," is merely discharging a preexisting obli-
gation.5 6 In this sense, the attorney is "giving" what she owes, and
thereby has no claim to compensation. Second, a court may recognize
that something has been "taken," but find that the attorney has been
compensated in return. The compensation is most often portrayed as a
"monopoly privilege" or a "license" to practice law,57 but it is some-
The Attorney as an Officer of the Court: Time to Take the Gown off the Bar, 35 S.C.L.
REV. 541 (1984) (characterization leads to "fundamental defect of substituting a
label for an analysis" and should be abandoned). The collective will of attor-
neys, while perhaps stronger than an individual attorney's, poses other
problems. See F.T.C. v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 110 S. Ct. 768
(1990) (boycott by attorneys appointed to represent indigent defendants consti-
tuted restraint of trade in violation of antitrust laws).
55. See United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633, 635 (9th Cir. 1965) (applicant
for admission to bar may 'justly be deemed to be aware" of obligation to pro-
vide uncompensated service), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 978 (1966); accord Dolan v.
United States, 351 F.2d 671, 672 (5th Cir. 1965) (same) (quoting Dillon). Char-
acterizing the attorney as willing by finding implied consent is closely related to
both the "ethical obligation" approach and the "incident to license" approach.
In addition to finding an implied willingness on part of the attorney, a court
may stretch far to find an expression of willingness. See Lewis v. Lane, 816 F.2d
1165 (7th Cir. 1987). In Lewis, plaintiff-prisoners filed a motion to substitute
counsel and argued that the first appointment of counsel under § 1915(d) was
invalid because the attorney did not validly consent to it. Lewis, 816 F.2d at
1168. Rather than reach the question of whether consent was necessary, the
Seventh Circuit found that the attorney had consented to the appointment. Id.
When appointed, attorney Adams contacted a magistrate and gave a
number of reasons why he did not want the case, including, like Mallard, an
unfamiliarity with civil rights cases. Id. The magistrate found none of his rea-
sons compelling and told Adams that if he declined the case, "his name would
be submitted to the chiefjudge of the federal district for possible termination of
his membership in the Southern District [of Illinois] bar. Adams then indicated
that he would take the case." Id.
The Seventh Circuit found that "[a]lthough Adams was a reluctant ap-
pointee, he did validly consent to represent the plaintiffs." Id.
56. This "giving" approach was advanced in Dillon. The court stated that
when an attorney is "called upon to fulfill" the obligation that accompanies ad-
mission to the bar, "he cannot contend that it is a 'taking of his services.' " Dil-
lon, 346 F.2d at 635. Proponents of the view were bolstered by the Supreme
Court's holding in Hurtado v. United States. See 410 U.S. 578 (1973). In holding
that a witness may be detained with compensation of one dollar per day without
affecting a "taking," the Court stated that payment was not required "for the
performance of a public duty [that] is already owed." Id. at 588.
57. The Tennessee Supreme Court has stated that "the license to practice
law carries with it as a condition and an obligation the rendition of public ser-
vice, including service by appointment for indigents." Huskey v. State, 743
S.W.2d 609, 611 (Tenn. 1988). The Supreme Court spoke to the issue in In re
Synder. 472 U.S. 634 (1985). Snyder was suspended from practice in the Eighth
Circuit for refusing to apologize to the court after stating in a letter that he was
"appalled by the amount of money which the federal court pays for indigent
13
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times expressed more tangibly. 58
3. Courts That Refuse to Uphold Appointment
Not all courts engage in these methods of recharacterizing the di-
chotomies; an equal number resist viewing the case as involving any-
thing other than an indigent, minimally deserving, civil plaintiff and an
unwilling, uncompensated attorney. Posing the issue in these terms, the
courts hold that the attorney may not be compelled to serve.
With respect to the descriptions of the litigant, the courts recognize
the unfortunate circumstance of those who cannot afford representa-
tion. But taken alone, that is not sufficient to outweigh the other charac-
teristics of the scenario. The litigant is "minimally deserving" for two
reasons. First, mere satisfaction of the threshold "frivolous or mali-
cious" scrutiny does not necessitate a conclusion that the litigant is de-
serving.59 The second reason is closely related to the litigant's "civil"
criminal defense work" and that he would not accept any more appointments
under the Criminal justice Act. Id. at 637.
In reversing Snyder's suspension, ChiefJustice Burger, writing for an unan-
imous Court, discussed the "complex code of behavior" to which lawyers are
subject.
[A] member of the bar enjoys singular powers that others do not pos-
sess; by virtue of admission, members of the bar share a kind of monop-
oly granted only to lawyers. Admission creates a license ... to appear
in court and try cases .... The license granted by the court requires
members of the bar to conduct themselves in a manner compatible with
the role of courts in the administration of justice.
Id. at 644.
For an example of the view that the obligation stems from the attorney's
monopoly privilege, see Christensen, supra note 19, at 14-18. For an example of
the view that rejects "taking" arguments while also rejecting the "conditioned
license" approach, see Note, supra note 24, at 390 (absence of compensation for
legal assistance rendered upon court appointment is not taking because eco-
nomic benefit of monopoly is compensation).
58. See Hirshorn, Pro Bono: The Legal Profession's Responsibility, 3 ME. B.J. 324
(1988). Mr. Hirshorn argues:
As attorneys, we know that a positive image helps us achieve suc-
cess for our profession. Relationships with the press, with the Legisla-
ture, and with other professions are enhanced when the Bar's image is
favorable. Our jobs are made easier; our tasks are more readily
accomplished.
The message is clear: Lawyers can help themselves . . .by
becoming involved in pro bono activities.
Id. at 324-35; accord Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274,
287 (1985) (pro bono serves professional interest of attorneys).
59. See Montague, supra note 7. Mr. Montague reported the views of Jack
London, co-author of the California Bar's amicus curiae brief in support of
Mallard:
Although federal judges are empowered to dismiss pauper suits
they deem frivolous, London says that judges have become more in-
clined to grant requests for counsel in those cases that they do accept.
"The request is often not made by the litigant," he says. "In my
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and "plaintiff" characteristics. Thus far, no court has held that such a
litigant has a constitutional right to counsel.60 This is so not only for
practical reasons,6 1 but also because of the generally unspoken attitude
that if such a right were recognized it would be abused.62
Courts that refuse to compel an attorney to serve display the great-
est degree of steadfastness to the prima facie characterization of the sce-
nario when they consider the dichotomies relating to the attorney. If the
issue is the validity of the appointment process-the attorney's will-the
courts reject the "inherent power" 63 and the "officer of the court"c
arguments and regard the attorney's will as relevant. Further, they re-
ject the "professional obligation" 65 and the "implied consent"6 6 argu-
experience, it is often made by the court, which wants to avoid a messy
pro se proceeding."
Montague, supra note 7, at 58 (quoting London). For a discussion of the "frivo-
lous or malicious" standard, see infra note 227.
60. The closest the Court has come to expressing a constitutional right for
civil litigants is the right of "meaningful access." Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S.
817, 828 (1977) (right of access to court requires prison authorities to assist
inmates in preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing pris-
oner with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in
law). In dissent, Justice Rehnquist proffered a "slippery slope" argument that
the holding entailed appointment of a lawyer. Id. at 841 (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing). This "broad view" reading of Bounds was rejected in Branch v. Cole, 686
F.2d 264, 266 n.1 (5th Cir. 1982).
61. See C. WOLFE, THE RISE OF MODERNJUDICIAL REVIEW 272 (1986) (major
argument against requiring assigned counsel in every case is sheer expense).
62. The real fear is that the abuse will come from prisoners with access to
legal materials and nothing better to do with their time. The Administrative
Office of the United States Courts reported that the number of prisoner suits
rose from 18,477 in fiscal year 1982-83 to 24,421 in 1987-88 and now accounts
for over 10% of civil actions in federal courts. Montague, supra note 7, at 58.
Although the attitude is generally unspoken, it was well articulated by Judge
Posner in McKeever v. Israel. See 689 F.2d 1315 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J., dis-
senting). Judge Posner dauntlessly portrayed the plaintiff's case as "a routine
prisoners' civil rights case: a scatter shot of implausible charges." Id. at 1324
(Posner, J., dissenting). He foresaw as the result of enlarging a prisoner's right
to counsel an "apocalypse" consisting of the decreased legitimacy and increased
futility of criminal punishment. Id. at 1325 (Posner, J., dissenting).
63. See State ex rel. Scott v. Roper, 688 S.W.2d 757, 768 (Mo. 1985) ("[W]e
do not believe that courts have the inherent power in civil cases to ... compel[]
representation without compensation.").
64. See DeLisio v. Alaska Superior Court, 740 P.2d 437, 441 (Alaska 1987)
(convinced that attorney may not be denied reasonable compensation solely on
basis of officer of court tradition), overruling Wood v. Superior Court, 690 P.2d
1225 (Alaska 1984); Roper, 688 S.W.2d at 766-67 (time has come to abandon
invoking doctrine that lawyers are officers of court).
65. See DeLisio, 740 P.2d at 441-42 (rejects professional obligation argu-
ment); Roper, 688 S.W.2d at 763-64 (same).
66. See DeLisio, 740 P.2d at 442 (rejects implied condition argument); Roper,
688 S.W.2d at 769 (same); Ruckenbrod v. Mullins, 102 Utah 548, 553, 133 P.2d
325, 327 (1943) (state cannot impose restrictions on acceptance of license which
deprive licensee of constitutional rights); State v. McKenney, 20 Wash. App.
797, 804-07, 582 P.2d 573, 576-78 (1978) (rejects implied obligation).
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ments and find that the attorney is indeed unwilling.
Where the case involves a "taking" argument, the courts hold that
the attorney has experienced a deprivation of property, has not been
compensated and has suffered a taking. 6 7 Some courts have found, in
the nature of pro bono work itself, the necessary condition that it be the
result of a free will in order to be meaningful. 68 Finally, some courts
67: See DeLisio, 740 P.2d at 443 (taking under state constitution); State ex rel.
Stephan v. Smith, 242 Kan. 336, 383, 747 P.2d 816, 842 (1987) (taking when
attorney is required to advance expense funds out-of-pocket for indigent with-
out compensation or to spend unreasonable amount of time resulting in sub-
stantial interference with practice); Roper, 688 S.W.2d at 768-69 (taking under
state constitution); Menin v. Menin, 79 Misc. 2d 285, 293, 359 N.Y.2d 721, 729-
30 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (taking in civil case lacking criminal overtones); State ex reL
Partain v. Oakley, 159 W. Va. 805, 813-14, 227 S.E.2d 314, 319 (1976) (confisca-
tory and unconstitutional); see also Bedford v. Salt Lake County, 22 Utah 2d 12,
447 P.2d 193 (1968) (suggesting that compelled service would be taking); cf
Family Div. Trial Lawyers v. Moultrie, 725 F.2d 695 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (applying
D.C. law) (unreasonable requirement of uncompensated service might qualify as
taking).
68. The view that the nature of pro bono work entails free choice was well
expressed by the Missouri Supreme Court.
The distinction between the furnishing of pro bono legal services
and court compelled legal services seems to have been lost in American
case law. The same principles are not applicable to both. Compelled legal
service is totally inconsistent with the giving of pro bono service as a matter of
professional responsibility or projessional pride. The latter two involve a mat-
ter of professional choice. It is the choice that makes the rendering of
the service self-fulfilling, pleasant, interesting, and successful. Compel-
ling the service deprives the professional of the element of professional choice. The
quality of the uncompensated service can be expected to decrease in
almost direct proportion to the loss of choice of the professional ren-
dering the service.
Roper, 688 S.W.2d at 768 (emphases added); see also, Shapiro, supra note 18, at
788 (responsibility implies an element of choice).
It is tautologous to say "a compelled act is not an act freely chosen." This
proposition is useful only to dispute those who would characterize an attorney as
"willing" to provide service, when in fact she is not. For a discussion of the
implied-will approach, see supra note 55 and accompanying text. But the tautol-
ogy does not address the arguments of those who, finding that attorneys are not
"choosing" to render uncompensated service, would compel them to do so,
even if that meant that the rendering of the service was not self-fulfilling, pleas-
ant or interesting.
Contained within the Missouri court's passage, however, is a separate argu-
ment that responds to such an approach. The court suggests that compelled
service would, in addition to being unpleasant or uninteresting, also be unsuc-
cessful. Roper, 688 S.W.2d at 768. Indeed, the last sentence of the passage
predicts a mathematical relationship between quality and choice. Id. Others
have advanced a similar argument. See Uelmen, Simmering on the "Backburer":
The Challenge of Yarbrough, 19 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 285, 310 (1985) ("[Tlhere is a
direct relationship between the level of compensation provided and the quality
of services rendered to indigents."); see also Gilbert & Gorenfeld, The Constitution
Should Protect Everyone-Even Lawyers, 12 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 75, 88-89 (1984)
(lawyers lack skills poor need, and if they have skills, would intentionally lessen
quality of service if forced to provide them). For a response to these arguments,
see Path to Equal Justice, supra note 31, at 370-72 (problems eliminated by "buy-
16
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 6 [1990], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol35/iss6/4
1990] NoTE 1191
have refused to compel service on equal protection69 and involuntary
servitude grounds. 70
C. The Background of Mallard
The foregoing provides an appreciation of the general atmosphere
besetting the matter of court-appointed representation as a form of
mandatory pro bono when, in January 1987,John Mallard gained admis-
sion to the Iowa bar. 7 1 Six months later, the Volunteer Lawyers' Pro-
ject 7 2 informed him that he had been selected to represent inmates at
the Iowa State Penitentiary in an in forma pauperis proceeding in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa. 73 After
out" provisions, limited areas of representation, other ethical constraints,
changed attitudes and requirement of minimum time as opposed to minimum
number of cases).
69. See Cunningham v. Superior Court, 177 Cal. App. 3d 336, 222 Cal.
Rptr. 854 (1986) (insuperable obstacles stand in way of allocating pro bono
work in paternity cases so as not to violate equal protection); see also Family Div.
Trial Lawyers v. Moultrie, 725 F.2d 695 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (material fact issue
existed as to attorneys' equal protection claim).
70. See In re Nine Applications for Appointment of Counsel in Title VII Pro-
ceedings, 475 F. Supp. 87 (N.D. Ala. 1979) (Guin, J.) (Title VII provision al-
lowing for appointment of counsel violated thirteenth amendment), vacated sub
nom. White v. United States Pipe & Foundry Co., 646 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. Unit B
1981); cf Brooks v. Central Bank, 717 F.2d 1340 (11th Cir. 1983) (reversing
Guin, J., who had again attempted to reach thirteenth amendment issue in case
involving attorney's motion to withdraw).
71. Mallard graduated from law school in December 1980 and spent his
first two years of practice in San Diego, where he was involved "primarily in
representation of creditors in debt collection and bankruptcy proceedings." Af-
fidavit ofJohn Mallard in Support of Motion to Withdraw, Traman v. Parkin, No.
87-317-B (S.D. Iowa 1987), reprinted in Joint Appendix at 30, Mallard (No. 87-
1490). After a year as in-house counsel for an investment group, he became
associated with Iowa attorney Jay B. Marcus. Id. at 31-32. InJanuary 1987, he
was admitted to the bar of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Iowa and became a partner at Marcus & Mallard. Id. at 32, 35.
72. The Volunteer Lawyer's Project (VLP) was created in 1982 by the Legal
Services Corporation of Iowa and the Iowa State Bar Association "as an attempt
to harness the resources of private attorneys throughout the state on behalf of
low-income individuals." Amicus Curiae Brief for Legal Services Corporation of
Iowa at 3, Mallard (No. 87-1490).
73. Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1817. VLP requested that Mallard represent "two
current inmates and one former inmate who sued prison officials under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that prison guards and administrators had filed false dis-
ciplinary reports against them, mistreated them physically, and endangered their
lives by exposing them as informants." Id. The prisoners' case involved three
plaintiffs and eight defendants. Motion to Withdraw, Traman v. Parkin, No. 87-
317-B (S.D. Iowa 1987), reprinted in Joint Appendix at 5, Mallard (No. 87-1490).
The request was a routine procedure under a referral program adopted by
VLP pursuant to the order of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals that each
district court "obtain a sufficient list of attorneys practicing throughout the dis-
trict so as to supply the court with competent attorneys who will serve in pro
bono situations." Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1816 (quoting Nelson v. Redfield Litho-
graph Printing, 728 F.2d 1003, 1005 (8th Cir. 1984)). "[Any attorney admitted
17
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reviewing the case, 74 Mallard filed a motion to withdraw. 7 5 When a
magistrate denied his motion, Mallard appealed. 76 Along with his ap-
peal, he filed a motion to be dismissed on the grounds that section
1915(d) did not authorize mandatory appointment. 77 The court denied
to practice in the Southern District of Iowa who has appeared in a non-bank-
ruptcy federal case in the past five years is eligible for appointment." Amicus
Curiae Brief for Legal Services Corporation of Iowa at 3, Mallard (No. 87-1490).
The list of eligible attorneys was divided alphabetically into thirds, and requests
were made from each third in successive years. Id. at 4. An attorney's odds of
being selected to handle one case every three years were one in nine. Mallard,
109 S. Ct. at 1817 n.1.
74. Mallard contacted VLP and attempted to withdraw from the case. Mo-
tion to Withdraw, Traman v. Parkin, No. 87-317-B (S.D. Iowa 1987), reprinted in
Joint Appendix at 7, Mallard (No. 87-1490). He offered to "substitute as counsel
in another case which involved an area of practice which [he understood], such
as bankruptcy law or securities law." Id. VLP informed him that one could be
relieved of an obligation to participate in the program by "signing up for other
volunteer lawyers projects with the legal services program." Id. VLP told him,
however, that because his "name had been given to the court, [he] would have to
make a motion to the court to withdraw." Id.
Thus, had Mallard previously rendered pro bono service, he would not have
been selected under the referral program. VLP deleted from the selection pool
the names of attorneys who voluntarily performed pro bono work. Mallard, 109
S. Ct. at 1816. The effect of the program, then, was to remedy the unequal
distribution of pro bono work. Cf C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHics 950
(1986) ("Probably many lawyers, perhaps a majority, engage in no pro bono
work and the bulk of the work is performed by the few.") (footnote omitted).
Mysteriously, Mallard claimed, "I provide voluntary services in my practice."
Coyle, Should Pro Bono Be Mandatoy: Organized Bar, Courts Are Split, NAT'L LJ.,
Mar. 6, 1989, at 3, 48 (quoting Mallard).
75. Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1817. Mallard stated that he was unfamiliar with
§ 1983 issues, lacked deposition and cross-examination experience, and re-
peated his offer to take a different case. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. In addition to advancing the new argument that the court lacked
authority under § 1915(d) to require him to take the case, Mallard attempted to
strengthen his original argument. The ABA Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct state: "A Lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Com-
petent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation." MODEL RULES supra
note 22, Rule 1.1. Mallard argued that, due to his unfamiliarity with § 1983 and
his lack of the skills necessary to handle such a case, he would violate the ethical
obligation imposed on him by Rule 1.1 if he were forced to take the case. Mal-
lard, 109 S. Ct. at 1817.
A similar argument, involving an ethics opinion rather than bar rules, failed
in a recent state case. See State v. Jones, 726 S.W.2d 515 (Tenn. 1987). Inter-
preting Disciplinary Rule 5-105(D) of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
the Board of Professional Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tennessee
opined: "[Tihe County Attorney cannot represent criminal defendants prose-
cuted by County officers .... [T]he partner or associate of the County attorney
is also prohibited from such representation." Jones, 726 S.W.2d at 522. Attor-
ney Banks was the law partner of the county attorney. Id. at 517. Banks was
appointed to represent a defendant charged with disorderly conduct. He ob-
jected to the appointment and invoked the ethics opinion in his support. Id.
Nonetheless, the trial judge ordered him to represent the defendant. When he
refused, the judge found Banks in contempt. Id. The court of appeals affirmed,
18
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both the appeal and the motion.78
Mallard then sought a writ of mandamus from the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals to compel the district court to permit him to with-
draw.79 When the court, without opinion, denied the writ, Mallard
sought review from the United States Supreme Court, which granted
certiorari8 ° to resolve the conflict over the meaning of section
1915(d). 8 1
Justice Brennan, writing for a majority of the Supreme Court,8 2 re-
versed the judgment of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals and re-
manded the case for further proceedings.83 Following "the judicial
practice of dealing with the largest questions in the most narrow way," 8 4
Justice Brennan was careful to confine the opinion to the statutory ques-
tion and to sidestep the volatile ethical and public policy issues of the
holding that the ethics opinion "did not have the force of law and was not bind-
ing on the courts." Id. The supreme court affirmed. Id. at 521.
78. Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1817. The court agreed with the magistrate's
finding that Mallard was competent. Id. In response to Mallard's § 1915(d)
challenge, the district court cited authority for the proposition that § 1915(d)
empowers the court to appoint attorneys. See Coburn v. Nix, No. 86-716-B (S.D.
Iowa 1987), reprinted in Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 3a, Mallard (No. 87-
1490).
79. Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1817.
80. Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 109 S. Ct. 51 (1988) (granting pe-
tition for certiorari). Recognizing the important policy issues in the case, amici
curiae from across the country filed briefs. Mallard received support from the
State Bar of California and the California Attorneys for CriminalJustice together
with the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. Amicus Curiae
Brief for State Bar of California, Mallard (No. 87-1490); Amici Curiae Brief of
California Attorneys for Criminal Justice and the National Association of Crimi-
nal Defense Lawyers, Mallard (No. 87-1490). That Mallard piqued the California
Bar's interest was perhaps unsurprising. "Except for California, state bar associa-
tions appear to have little direct formal institutional contact with the federal
courts . . . ." Wasby, The Bar's Role in Governance of the Ninth Circuit, 25 WILLAM-
ETrE L. REV. 471, 499 (1989) (emphasis added). One of the California Bar's
federal court-related activities "includes meetings in each district with the chief
judge and other district judges present, at which pending federal legislation,
ramifications of particular court rulings, and other topics such as lawyer disci-
pline ... are discussed." Id. at 501.
In favor of the district court were the Legal Services Corporation of Iowa
and the Association of the Bar of the City of New York. Amicus Curiae Brief for
Legal Services Corporation of Iowa, Mallard (No. 87-1490); Amicus Curiae Brief
of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Mallard (No. 87-1490).
The ABA, perhaps mindful of or exhausted from the furor surrounding the
development of Model Rule 6.1, did not take a position on the case. See Monta-
gue, supra note 7, at 55.
81. See Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1817.
82. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Brennan, White, Scalia and Ken-
nedy comprised the majority. Justice Kennedy also wrote a concurring opinion.
83. Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1823.
84. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
1990] NOTE 1193
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case. 85 In the first, and most protracted, portion of the opinion, the
Court construed. the meaning of request in section 1915(d) and con-
cluded that it was not synonymous with appoint.86 In the second part of
the opinion, the Court sanctioned Mallard's use of the writ of
mandamus. 87
The Court quickly reached a definition of request as used in section
1915(d). The Court proceeded from the premise that "[i]nterpretation
of a statute must begin with the statute's language." 88 The Court stated
that the operative term in the statute is request,89 and commenced to in-
vestigate its meaning. First, the Court determined that the term com-
monly is used to express a desire that someone do something, but lacks
the imperative force of a demand. 90 Having discovered its ordinary
meaning, the Court stated that there was no reason to think that Con-
gress intended it to have any other.91 Therefore, the Court concluded,
the term as used in section 1915(d) is precatory. 92
Equipped with this interpretation of the definition that Congress
85. See Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1823. Justice Brennan was explicit in his
avoidance of the larger issues. "We do not decide today whether, or under what
conditions,... any... federal statute providing for the 'assignment' or 'appoint-
ment' of counsel authorizes federal courts to compel an unwilling attorney to
render service. Nor do we offer an opinion on the constitutionality of compul-
sory assignments." Id. at 1821 n.6. "[W]e do not reach the question whether
the federal courts have inherent authority to order attorneys to represent liti-
gants without pay .... Id. at n.8.
In case the point was missed, the last section of the opinion was devoted to
limiting the decision:
We emphasize that our decision today is limited to interpreting§ 1915(d). We do not mean to question ... lawyers' ethical obligation
to assist those who are too poor to afford counsel .... Nor do we
express an opinion on the question whether the federal courts possess
inherent authority to require lawyers to serve .... We hold only that§ 1915(d) does not authorize the federal courts to make coercive ap-
pointments of counsel.
Id. at 1822-23.
86. Id. at 1818-21.
87. Id. at 1822.
88. Id. at 1818 (citing United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 109 S. Ct.
1026, 1030 (1989) and Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681, 685
(1985)).
89. Id.
90. Id. The Court stated:
The import of the term seems plain. To request that somebody do
something is to express a desire that he do it, even though he may not
generally be disciplined or sanctioned if he declines .... [S]omebody
who refuses a request, as the word is ordinarily used, may not be penal-
ized formally for doing so ....
Id. In contrast to the "ordinary usage,"Justice Brennan offered as an example a
soldier who fails to fulfill a superior's request and who may then be court-mar-
tialed for refusal to obey orders. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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intended, Justice Brennan mounted a protracted justification of it.93 In
the first defense of its interpretation, 94 the Court contrasted subsections
(c) and (d) of section 1915.95 The Court read subsection (c) to exem-
plify Congress's ability to employ compulsory language, i.e., the term
shall.9 6 The Court stated that the reasonable interpretation of subsec-
tion (d), in which Congress did not use that compulsory language, is that
Congress did not intend subsection (d) to authorize mandatory
appointment. 9 7
In its second defense of the interpretation,98 the Court examined
state statutes governing in forma pauperis proceedings when Congress
adopted section 1915(d) in 1892. 99 Of the twelve states that at that time
had informa pauperis statutes permitting courts to secure counsel,'°° each
provided that a court could "assign" or "appoint" counsel. The Court
concluded that Congress's decision, in light of its awareness of the state
practices, to allow the federal courts only to request attorneys to serve
suggested that Congress intended to permit attorneys to decline the
request. 101
Having distinguished the original section 1915(d) from its contem-
93. Id. at 1818-21. The majority offered six defenses for its interpretation
of the meaning of request. Each defense is discussed: the first infra at notes 94-97
and accompanying text; the second infra at notes 98-101 and accompanying text;
the third infra at notes 102-05 and accompanying text; the fourth infra at notes
106-08 and accompanying text; the fifth infra at notes 109-11 and accompanying
text; and the sixth infra at notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
94. The Court claimed that its first defense yielded "[p]erhaps the clearest
proof that Congress did not intend § 1915(d) to license compulsory appoint-
ment. . . ." Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1818.
95. Id. Subsection (c) reads: "The officers of the court shall issue and serve
all process, and perform all duties in such cases. Witnesses shall attend as in
other cases, and the same remedies shall be available as are provided for by law
in other cases." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(c) (1988) (emphases added).
Subsection (d) reads: "The court may request an attorney to represent any
such person unable to employ counsel and may dismiss the case if the allegation
of poverty is untrue, or if satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious." Id.
§ 1915(d) (emphasis added).
For a discussion of the "frivolous or malicious" standard, see infra note 227.
96. Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1818 ("Congress evidently knew how to require
service when it deemed compulsory service appropriate.").
97. Id.
98. See id. at 1818-19.
99. The in forma pauperis statute, now codified, as amended, at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915, was adopted in 1892. Act ofJuly 20, 1892, ch. 209, §§ 1-5, 27 Stat. 252.
For the development of the current version of the statute, see Act of June 25,
1948, ch. 646, § 1915, 62 Stat. 670, 954; Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 98, 63
Stat. 89, 104; Act of Oct. 31, 1951, ch. 655, § 51(b)-(c), 65 Stat. 710, 727; and
Act of Sept. 21, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-320, 73 Stat. 590, as amended by Act of
Oct. 10, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-82, § 6, 93 Stat. 643, 645.
100. Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1819. The 12 states were Arkansas, Illinois, In-
diana, Kentucky, Missouri, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Tennessee,
Texas, Virginia and West Virginia. Id.
101. Id.
21
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porary state statutes, the Court put forth its third defense of the inter-
pretation of request. 0 2 The Court expressed doubt over the extent to
which any of the state statutes authorized courts to sanction attorneys
who refused to serve without compensation. '03 The Court attributed its
doubt to the fact that "few appointments were made pursuant to those
statutes,. . . many legal proceedings went unrecorded, and... lawyers
seem rarely to have balked at courts' assignments." 14 As evidence that
Congress did not intend to replicate a system of coercive appointment,
the Court noted that prior to the enactment of section 1915(d) no re-
ported decision held that a lawyer must provide representation without
compensation.' 0 5 Thus, even if Congress did not intend to distinguish
section 1915(d) from the state statutes, it would not necessarily follow
that it intended to enact a coercive system of appointment.
The Court's fourth and fifth defenses of its interpretation involved
comparisons of section 1915(d) to similar federal statutes enacted
before and after section 1915(d). In its fourth defense, 10 6 the Court
pointed out that the only federal statute providing for court-ordered
representation enacted prior to section 1915(d) contained the term as-
sign. 10 7 From this evidence the Court concluded that " 'assign' was al-
ready part of the federal lexicon," and Congress's decision not to
employ it "might be taken to display a reluctance to require attorneys to
serve" indigent civil litigants.' 08 Similarly, in its fifth defense,' 0 9 the
Court noted that "[elvery federal statute still in force that was passed
after [section 1915(d)] and that authorize[d] courts to provide counsel
state[d] that courts [could] 'assign' or 'appoint' attorneys.""l 0 The
Court concluded that these later enactments "afford no reason to be-
lieve that the plain meaning of section 1915(d) is not its intended
meaning." 11
102. See id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. (citing Shapiro, supra note 18, at 749-62). The Court found English
precedent "equally murky," and quoted Professor Shapiro's conclusion: "To
justify coerced, uncompensated legal services on the basis of a firm tradition in
England and the United States is to read into that tradition a story that is not
there." Id. (quoting Shapiro, supra note 18, at 753).
106. Id. at 1820-21.
107. Id. at 1820 (citing Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 29, 1 Stat. [112,] 118
[codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3005 (1988)]).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1821.
110. Id. at 1821. In both the fourth and fifth defenses the Court carefully
avoided the appearance of endorsing the compulsory nature of those other stat-
utes. The Court played the term request off of the terms assign and appoint in
other statutes in order to demonstrate the weakness of § 1915(d), not to demon-
strate the coercive nature of those other statutes. See id. at 1821 n.6. In its fifth
defense, the Court implicitly made the point by referring to the subsequently
enacted statutes as "apparently coercive." Id. at 1821.
111. Id.
1196
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Finally, the Court, in its sixth defense, rejected the district court's
argument that construing request to allow courts to ask but not compel
attorneys to represent indigent clients rendered the subsection a nul-
lity."l 2 The argument was: (1) statutory authorization is unnecessary
for a court simply to ask an attorney to represent someone; (2) section
1915(d) would be superfluous if it did no more than that; (3) a statute
should be construed so that no part of it is superfluous; (4) therefore,
section 1915(d) must be read to confer coercive power upon the federal
courts; (4) therefore, to read it otherwise is to misread it-to render it a
nullity.' 11
The Court dismissed the argument on two grounds. First, the
Court rejected the initial premise as too strong. Contrary to being "un-
necessary," the Court stated, statutory provisions may simply codify ex-
isting rights and powers."14 Second, the Court denied that the
conclusion followed from the premises. Section 1915(d) as construed
informs lawyers that a court's request is "appropriate" rather than "im-
proper"; therefore, claimed the Court, it "plays a useful role in the stat-
utory scheme" and is not a nullity."i 5
Distinct from the statutory construction issue was the appropriate-
ness of Mallard's use of the writ of mandamus as a remedy. Mallard filed
his petition for certiorari after the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals had
denied his application for a writ of mandamus.' 1 6 To confine a district
court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction, the Court noted,
was one of the traditional uses of the writ.' 17 The writ is an extraordi-
nary remedy, however, and the Court is reluctant to condone its use., 18
112. Id. at 1821.
113. Id.
114. Id. The Court provided an example: "Section 1915(d) ... authorizes
courts to dismiss a 'frivolous or malicious' action, but there is little doubt they
would have power to do so even in absence of this statutory provision." Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1822. The Attorney General of Iowa had posed as a counter-
statement of the question presented for review the following: "Is 28 U.S.C.
1915(d) so unambiguous that rational and substantial legal argument on its con-
struction cannot be made, so that a pretrial petition for mandamus to the district
court must be granted?" Respondent's Brief in Opposition to Petition for a
Writ of Certiorari at i, Mallard (No. 87-1490).
Justice Stevens was of a like mind. He stated: "As this case comes to us...
the question is whether a lawyer may seek relief by way of mandamus from the
court's request .... " Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1823 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
117. Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1822. Apart from the use of the writ to confine
an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its jurisdiction, the Court noted one
other traditional use, that of "compel[ling] [an inferior court] to exercise its au-
thority when it is its duty to do so." Id. (citing Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n,
319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943)).
118. Id. The Court gave two reasons for its reluctance: the undesirability
of making a district court judge a litigant and the inefficiency of piecemeal appel-
late litigation. Id. (citing Kerr v. United States Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 402-03
(1976) and Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 35 (1980)).
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To be entitled to the writ, a petitioner must demonstrate a clear abuse of
discretion"19 or conduct amounting to usurpation of the judicial
power,' 20 a lack of adequate alternative means to obtain the relief
sought 12 1 and a clear and indisputable right to issuance of the writ. 12 2
The Court found that Mallard met this standard. Because the dis-
trict court rested its decision solely on section 1915(d), and because the
Supreme Court determined that section 1915(d) does not authorize co-
ercive appointments of counsel, the district court "plainly acted beyond
its 'jurisdiction.' ",123 Mallard had no alternative remedy available, and
the reasons for the reluctance to issue the writ were not present.' 24
Therefore, the Court concluded that the court of appeals erred in deny-
ing the application. 125
Justice Kennedy, who provided the fifth vote, wrote a short concur-
ring opinion.126 His opinion stressed two points. First, he reiterated
the Court's attempt to narrow the decision: "[It] speaks to the interpre-
tation of a statute, to the requirements of the law, and not to the profes-
sional responsibility of the lawyer."' 2 7 Next, he went further than
Justice Brennan and expounded on the nature of that professional ethi-
cal responsibility:
Lawyers... have obligations to their calling which exceed their
obligations to the State . . . . Accepting a court's request to
represent the indigent is one of [the lawyer's] traditional obli-
gations. Our judgement here does not suggest otherwise. To
the contrary, it is precisely because our duties go beyond what
the law demands that ours remains a noble profession.128
Justice Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion. 129 Unlike the majority,
which had first interpreted section 1915(d) and then, based on that in-
119. Id. (quoting Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 383(1953)).
120. Id (quoting De Beers Consol. Mines, Ltd. v. United States, 325 U.S.
212, 217 (1945)).
121. Id. (citing Kerr v. United States Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 403 (1976)).
122. Id. (quoting Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 384
(1953)).
123. Id.
124. For a discussion of the reasons why the Court is reluctant to issue a
writ of mandamus, see supra note 118. Those reasons were not present in Mal-
lard because Judge Vietor, the district court judge, was not a litigant, and Mal-
lard was not attempting to sever one element of the case from the rest. See
Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1822.
125. Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1822.
126. Id. at 1823 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
127. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
128. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring). For a discussion of the relationship be-
tween Justice Kennedy's view and Justice Stevens's view, see infra note 136.
129. Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1823 (StevensJ., dissenting). Justices Marshall,
Blackmun and O'Connor joined in the dissent. Id.
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terpretation, concluded that Mallard's use of mandamus was appropri-
ate, Justice Stevens would have disposed of the case on procedural
grounds. For him, the issue was whether Mallard was entitled to relief
from the district court's request by way of mandamus.' 30 He neither
defined the elements that Mallard would have had to prove to be enti-
tled to the writ nor objected to any of the majority's standards.', He
did suggest, however, that Mallard should have had an "absolute right"
to withdraw in order for mandamus to be appropriate.' 3 2 Thus,
although Justice Stevens stated that the case "involves much more than
the parsing of the plain meaning of the word 'request' as used in 28
U.S.C. [section] 1915(d),"'3 he devoted much of his opinion to doing
just that in order to demonstrate that Mallard, if not absolutely com-
pelled to accept the case, l3 did not have an absolute right to withdraw.
130. Id. at 1823 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens rhetorically nar-
rowed the question: "[Tlhe question is whether a lawyer may seek relief by way
of mandamus from the court's request simply because he would rather do some-
thing else with his time." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
131. For a discussion of the standards used by the majority, see supra notes
117-22 and accompanying text.
132. Cf Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1826 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The notion
that this petitioner had an absolute right to have his 'motion to withdraw'
granted by the District Court-and therefore that a writ of mandamus should
properly issue-is completely unacceptable to me.").
133. Id. at 1823 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In addition, Justice Stevens
stated, the case did not involve the sufficiency of an attorney's reasons for de-
clining appointment nor the possible sanctions for declining. Id. (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). He did, however, offer examples of reasons he thought would be
sufficient. For a discussion of those reasons, see infra note 134.
134. Justice Stevens would not construe § 1915(d) as imparting an absolute
duty to accept a case. See Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1-825 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Rather, he appears to have suggested that § 1915(d) establishes a presumption
of duty, under which counsel is required to serve "absent good reason." Id
(Stevens, J., dissenting). As examples of such good reasons, for which an attor-
ney "may properly decline" appointment, he offered: (1) conflict of interest; (2)
engagement in another trial; (3) previous acceptance of "more than a fair share"
of the profession's uncompensated burdens; and (4) lack of qualification for a
particular case. Id. at 182 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens's list of sufficient reasons for declining appointment are in
accordance with those listed in the ABA's Model Rule 6.2:
A lawyer shall not seek to avoid appointment by a tribunal to rep-
resent a person except for good cause, such as:
(a) representing the client is likely to result in violation of the rules
of professional conduct or other law;
(b) representing the client is likely to result in an unreasonable fi-
nancial burden on the lawyer; or
(c) the client or the cause is so repugnant to the lawyer as to be
likely to impair the client-lawyer relationship or the lawyer's ability to
represent the client.
MODEL RULES, supra note 22, Rule 6.2. Comment 1 to the Rule states that "[a]
lawyer may... be subject to appointment by a court to serve.., persons unable
to afford legal counsel." Id. at comment 1. The same ideal was expressed in the
Model Code:
When a lawyer is appointed by a court or requested by a bar associ-
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In his view, section 1915(d) "should be construed to require counsel to
serve, absent good reason, when requested to do so by the court."' 135
Justice Stevens's opinion proceeded from the premise that "[t]he
relationship between a court and the members of its bar is not defined
by statute alone."' 3 6 Having proclaimed his willingness to probe be-
yond the confines of the statute, he first turned to the issue of a court's
inherent authority. He noted the Court's recent recognition of the legit-
imacy of the bar's interest in requiring its members to share the burden
of representing indigent defendants in criminal cases, 137 and asserted
that the recognition "reflects the fact that a court's power ... is firmly
rooted in the authority to define the terms and conditions upon which
members are admitted to the bar.., and to exercise 'those powers nec-
essary to protect the functioning of its own processes.' "1138
After providing examples of the "ancient tradition[]" of the lawyer's
duty to serve, 139 correlative to the court's right to require service, Jus-
ation to undertake representation of a person unable to obtain counsel,
whether for financial or other reasons, he should not seek to be ex-
cused from undertaking the representation except for compelling
reasons.
MODEL CODE, supra note 21, EC 2-29 (footnote omitted).
135. Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1825 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens
would have construed request as used in § 1915(d) to mean "respectfully com-
mand." Id. at 1826 (Stevens,J., dissenting). For the "good reasons" which jus-
tify denial of the command, see supra note 134.
136. Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1823 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy
would clearly agree to the premise that the relationship between a court and the
bar is not defined by statute alone. For a discussion of Justice Kennedy's con-
curring opinion, see supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text. Unlike Justice
Stevens, however, who concentrated on the mandamus issue and was trying to
prove only that Mallard did not have an absolute right to withdraw, Justice Ken-
nedy limited his focus to interpreting the statute and could not bring himself to
conclude that it amounted to an absolute duty to serve. See id. at 1823 (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring).
Justice Stevens maintained that a collection of elements shapes the relation-
ship between a court and an attorney. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). In addition
to statutory definition of an attorney's duty, he would include "tradition, respect
for the profession, the inherent power of the judiciary, and the commands that
are set forth in canons of ethics, rules of court, and legislative enactments." Id.
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
137. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Barnard v. Thorstenn, 109 S. Ct.
1294, 1299 (1989)).
138. Id. at 1824 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing, for the first proposition,
Frazier v. Heebe, 482 U.S. 641 (1987) and quoting, for the second, Young v.
United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 821 (1987) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment)).
139. See id. at 1824-25 & n.4 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Justice Car-
dozo's opinion in People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465, 470-71, 162 N.E.
487, 489 (1928) (appellant might be assigned as counsel for the needy without
pay); E. BROWN, LAWYERS AND THE PROMOTION OF JUSTICE 253-54 (1938) (has
long been customary for court to assign counsel to indigents); R. SMrrH,JUSTICE
AND THE POOR 100 (1967) (statutory power to assign counsel in addition to
court's inherent power)).
1200
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tice Stevens concluded that section 1915(d) "embodies this authority to
order counsel to represent indigent litigants."' 140 It was this power to
appoint counsel, he opined, already codified in the "humane and en-
lightened States" laws,' 4 ' that Congress intended to codify in section
1915(d). To construe it otherwise, he maintained, would be to defeat
Congress's purpose. 14 2
Justice Stevens next attempted to refute the majority's second de-
fense 14 3 of its interpretation by downplaying the significance of Con-
gress's use in section 1915(d) of the word request while all the states'
statutes used either appoint or assign. 44 He pointed out that both Con-
gress in debating the statute and courts in applying it had used the terms
interchangeably.1 4 5 He concluded that Congress understood request and
appoint or assign to impose "similar obligations[,] and simply assumed"
that attorneys would perform their duty.' 46
To further his point that Mallard did not have an absolute right to
withdraw from the case and, therefore, was not entitled to a writ of man-
damus, Justice Stevens analogized to the quasi-estoppel principle that
once an attorney has made an appearance in a case, the attorney may not
withdraw without leave of court. ' 4 7 Justice Stevens recognized that Mal-
140. Id. at 1825 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
141. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1079, 52d Cong.,
1st Sess. 1-2 (1892)). Justice Stevens pointed out that, in addition to the 12
states that had statutory power to appoint counsel, "at least 10 other States" had
common law power to do so. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). For a list of the 12
states that had statutory power, see supra note 100. The 10 that had common
law power were California, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Missis-
sippi, Montana, Tennessee and Wisconsin. Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1825 n.5 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting). Because Tennessee is included on the majority's list of the
12 states that had statutory authority, Justice Stevens's list contains only nine
"other" states. Thus, the number of states, out of 42, that had either statutory
or common law authority to appoint counsel was 21.
142. Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1825 (Stevens,J., dissenting). It was in this con-
text that Justice Stevens gave short shrift to the majority's reliance on "recent
scholarship" to cast doubt on state courts' power to sanction attorneys who re-
fused to represent indigent clients. See id. at 1825 n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Because Justice Stevens viewed the procedural posture of the case as limited
solely to Mallard's request for a writ of mandamus he thought the majority
"largely misse[d] the point" with its third defense. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
For a discussion of the majority's third defense, see supra notes 102-05 and ac-
companying text. According to Justice Stevens, the case's posture demanded an
examination of a court's power to issue the order. Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1825
n.6 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
143. For a discussion of the Court's second defense, see supra notes 98-101
and accompanying text.
144. Cf. Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1825-26 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (Justice Ste-
vens "attaches no particular significance to the difference").
145. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Court itself often uses the terms in-
terchangeably. See infra note 193.
146. Id. at 1826 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
147. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). The justification for this quasi-estoppel
principle is that "the court's interest in making sure that a litigant is adequately
1990] 1201NOTE
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lard did not quite fit this scenario, since Mallard had filed his motion to
withdraw without entering an appearance.' 48 Nevertheless, he found
evidence of Mallard's recognition of the duty to accept the appointment
in the fact that Mallard thought it appropriate to request permission to
withdraw.149
Justice Stevens next maintained that Mallard implicitly assumed an
obligation to participate in the court's assignment program when he be-
came a member of the Iowa bar. 150 Because Justice Stevens viewed
court rules as a determinative element of an attorney's duty,' 5 ' he con-
cluded that a request, pursuant to a "fair and detailed procedure," 152 to
represent an indigent, is "tantamount to a command."' 53
Finally, on the basis of these arguments Justice Stevens concluded
that he would construe the term request to mean "respectfully com-
mand."1 5 He claimed that, "[if that is not what Congress intended,
the statute is virtually meaningless."' 5 5 He rejected the majority's con-
tention that request could be merely precatory and that the statute could
remain purposeful by alerting attorneys that the court's request was
"appropriate" and should not be lightly disregarded. 156 To the con-
trary, he was of the opinion that the Congress that enacted section
represented and that the orderly prosecution of the lawsuit is not disrupted is
paramount to a lawyer's personal interest in terminating a relationship with a
client." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Ohntrup v. Firearms Center, Inc.,
802 F.2d 676 (3d Cir. 1986) and Mekdeci v. Merrell Nat'l Laboratories, 711 F.2d
1510, 1521-22 (11 th Cir. 1983)). But cf. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967) (appointed attorney who considers client's appeal frivolous may file brief
and then withdraw). At least one state has refused to follow Anders. Huguley v.
State, 253 Ga. 709, 710, 324 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1985) ("We... announce to the
Bar that the Anders motion will no longer be entertained in this court.").
148. Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1826 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Because Mallard
had not made an appearance before filing his motion to withdraw, Justice Ste-
vens suggested that the motion "might more appropriately have been captioned
as a 'petition to be excused from performing a nonexistent duty to enter an
appearance in a pending case.' " Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
149. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (motion to withdraw "is evidence of [Mal-
lard's] recognition of some duty to accept the appointment unless there was a
valid excuse for declining it.").
150. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan endeavored to answer
this implied-obligation argument in the majority opinion. See id. at 1819 n.4.
151. For a discussion of the elements that Justice Stevens thought shaped
the relationship of the court and the members of its bar, see supra note 136.
152. Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1826; cf. Wood v. Alaska Superior Court, 690
P.2d 1225, 1227-28 (Alaska 1984), overruled on other grounds, DeLisio v. Alaska
Superior Court, 740 P.2d 437 (Alaska 1987) (system for appointing counsel to
represent indigent criminal defendants was to draw names from list compiled
from private attorneys listed in city telephone book).
153. Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1826 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
154. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
155. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens here advanced the view
dealt with by the majority in its sixth defense. For a discussion of the sixth de-
fense, see supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
156. Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1826 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
1202 [Vol. 35: p. 1175
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1915(d) assumed it would be "unthinkable" for an attorney to decline
the request without good reason.1 5 7
III. ANALYsis
The opinion of the "unlikely majority"' 58 in Mallard v. United States
District Court ' 5 9 was narrow, limited to the interpretation of the term
request in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). 16 0 Concluding that the term as used by
157. Id. at 1826-27 (Stevens, J., dissenting). At this point, Justice Stevens
made reference to the remarks of Missouri Supreme Court Justice Blackmar's
dissenting opinion in State ex rel. Scott v. Roper. Id. at 1827 n.9 (Stevens, J., dis-
senting) (citing State ex rel. Scott v. Roper, 688 S.W.2d 757, 773 (Mo. 1985)
(Blackmar, J., dissenting)). In Roper, the Missouri Supreme Court denied that
state courts have the power to compel attorneys to represent indigent civil liti-
gants. Roper, 688 S.W.2d at 769.
158. See Stewart, Pro Bono, Sex and Partnership, A.B.A. J., July 1989, at 44
("The Mallard majority was an unlikely one, with Justice Brennan writing on be-
half of four conservative justices-White, Scalia, Kennedy and Rehnquist."); cf
Wermiel, Four Justices Seem Prepared to Assent to a Full-Time Role Focusing on Dissent,
Wall St.J., Oct. 16, 1989, at BI3, col. 1 (identifying Justices Brennan, Marshall,
Blackmun and Stevens as "liberal and moderate allies" most likely to join in
dissent from opinions of Court's new five-member conservative majority). A re-
cent analysis suggests that this categorization of the Justices on general ideologi-
cal grounds validly applies to the Court's approach to the more specific issue of
the affairs of lawyers and the legal profession. Schwartz, Lawyers and the Supreme
Court: Of Means and Ends, 3 GA. ST. L. REv. 179, 180 (1987).
In such cases, Professor Schwartz found that Justices Brennan, Marshall,
Blackmun and Stevens comprised one coalition, and the second was made up of
former Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Rehnquist, O'Connor and
White. Id. at 180-81. Professor Schwartz believed it was "too soon to pigeon-
hole Justice Scalia." Id. at 181. The Mallard alliances suggest that Justice Scalia
has fallen in with the latter group, both Justice Brennan and Justice O'Connor
have altered their fealty, and Justice Kennedy has adopted, perhaps disquietly,
his predecessor Justice Powell's attitude.
Justice Brennan's position was also surprising in light of earlier public re-
marks. See Address by justice Brennan at Harvard Law School (1967), reprinted in
Brennan, The Responsibilities of the Legal Profession, in THE PATH OF THE LAW FROM
1967 (A. Sutherland ed. 1968). Justice Brennan "warn[ed] that 'dabbling' in
public interest work or reliance upon permissive support for voluntary efforts
will not be enough to discharge the bar's responsibility to the public." F.
MARKS, K. LESWING & B. FORTINSKY, supra note 19, at 5 n.2. (citing Brennan, The
Responsibilities of the Legal Profession in THE PATH OF THE LAW FROM 1967 (A. Suth-
erland ed. 1968)). He also said "that the profession, dedicated to the service of
business, had neglected its social responsibility. He doubted then that the legal
profession was fully capable of or even willing to carry out its professional
charge." Id. at 203 (citing Brennan, The Responsibilities of the Legal Profession, in
THE PATH OF THE LAW FROM 1967 (A. Sutherland ed. 1968)).
159. Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1814 (1989).
160. Id. at 1822. For a discussion of the majority's statements on the nar-
rowness of the opinion, see supra note 85. For a discussion ofJustice Kennedy's
statement on the narrowness of the opinion, see supra note 127. See also Stewart,
supra note 158, at 44 (Mallard opinion "resolutely confined itself to the narrow
statutory question"); i at 46 (Mallard decision "turned entirely on the meaning
of 'request' ").
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Congress in that statute was precatory, 16 1 the Court refused to read the
statute as empowering federal courts to compel an unwilling attorney to
represent an indigent litigant in a civil case. 162 This Note first examines
the Court's interpretive method. Second, it discusses the decision's pos-
sible effects on the attorney-client (particularly the imprisoned client)
and court-attorney relationships.
A. Interpretation of Request as Used in Section 1915(d)
1. Styles of Statutory Construction
Because Mallard was a paradigmatic instance of statutory interpreta-
tion, it is appropriate to examine the Court's interpretive process.
Although interpretation of the law is preeminently a judicial task, 163 ju-
dicial construction does not take place in a vacuum. Judges must em-
ploy reasonably well-defined methods if the rest of the political
community is to accept their decisions. These methods have evolved
161. Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1818.
162. Id. at 1816. After Mallard, courts will do well not to rely on § 1915 for
the power to appoint counsel in either a criminal or a civil case. Under
§ 1915(a), the statute applies to both civil and criminal litigants. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(a) (1988) (applies to "any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal.").
The court is to request counsel under § 1915(d) for "any such person who is
unable to employ counsel." Therefore, the court's interpretation of request in
Mallard should control in criminal cases as well.
This conclusion finds support in the language used by the Court in the two
instances that it stated what was at stake in Mallard. The first sentence ofJustice
Brennan's opinion stated, "We are called upon to decide whether 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(d) authorizes a federal court to require an unwilling attorney to repre-
sent an indigent litigant in a civil case." Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1816 (emphasis
added). His penultimate sentence, however, stated: "We hold only that
§ 1915(d) does not authorize the federal courts to make coercive appointments
of counsel." Id. at 1823. This statement of the holding is not explicitly limited
to civil cases, and may be presumed to apply to criminal cases.
There are, of course, other sources of statutory authority for appointment
of counsel in criminal cases. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1988); FED. R. CRIM. P. 44.
The Court, if not casting into doubt the constitutionality of statutes authorizing
courts to compel an unwilling attorney to render service in a criminal case, at
least avoided endorsing them. See Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1821 & n.6 This reser-
vation on the part of the Court might, with enough imagination, be construed as
implicitly denigrating those statutes. A better interpretation is that Mallard was
simply an inappropriate context for considering the issue of appointing counsel
under statutes like 18 U.S.C. § 3006A, that apply only to criminal cases. The
various dichotomies should not be considered in isolation. The element com-
mon to both Mallard and the criminal context is that the attorney might be un-
willing to accept the appointment. But Mallard involved a civil plaintiff and an
uncompensated attorney, whereas § 3006A involves a criminal defendant and a
compensated attorney. These differences, considered as a whole, weigh heavily
against extrapolating Mallard beyond the narrow context of § 1915(d).
163. See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 833 n.40 (1988); Atas-
cadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 243, reh'g denied, 473 U.S. 926
(1985); United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 217 (1980); Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315 (1980); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,
703 (1974); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
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from litigants' ceaseless demands for a statement of what the law is.'64
No matter which interpretive method one adopts, the necessary ini-
tial step is to determine the proper standard against which to measure
the correctness of the result. 16 5 Courts most often employ one of two
standards: "legislative intent" and the "meaning of the statute."166 Im-
plicit in both standards is a functional, communicative model of stat-
utes-the text communicates "the will of society, articulated by the
legislature as society's agent for that purpose, to society's members, tell-
ing them how they should or should not behave or what consequences
should or might attach to certain actions or events."' 16 7 While the two
standards share this functional model of what a statute is, they differ in
the perspective they adopt for determining what a statute says. Commu-
nication involves two perspectives, the sender's and the receiver's. The
164. Frequently courts will state that interpretation is not necessary where
the words of a statute are "clear." See, e.g., Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 110 S. Ct.
1384, 1387 (1990) ("[W]here the terms of a statute are unambiguous, judicial
inquiry is complete[.]"); Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 481
U.S. 454, 461 (1987) (same); United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 606 (1986)
(same); Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 75 (1984) (same), reh'g denied, 469
U.S. 1230 (1985); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) ("Where
the language is plain and admits of no more than one meaning the duty of inter-
pretation does not arise."). Nevertheless, before a judge can decide if a statu-
tory term is unambiguous, she must assign a meaning to it. See Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 175 (1803) ("Those who apply the rule to a
particular case, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule."). In the
broadest sense, interpretation is involved whenevei one "makes a choice ...
about what to do regarding a matter to which a statute arguably applies." 2A N.
SINGER, SUTHERLAND STAT. CONST. (rev. 4th ed. 1984) § 45.03, at 15 [hereinafter
SUTHERLAND]. Thus, some commentators suggest that "[tihe assertion.., that a
statute needs no interpretation because it is 'clear and unambiguous' is in reality
evidence that the court has already considered and construed the act." Id.
§ 45.02, at 5.
165. SUTHERLAND, supra note 164, § 45.05, at 20 ("When a question arises
concerning applicability of a statute a decision can be reached only by applying
some kind of criterion."). A suspicious mind may inquire how to test the cor-
rectness of the standard, but this Note will not pursue that problem. Cf. M.
HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME 194 (J. Macquarrie & E. Robinson trans. 1962)
("Any interpretation which is to contribute understanding, must already have
understood what is to be interpreted.").
166. See SUTHERLAND, supra note 164, § 45.05, at 20-21, § 45.07, at 29. In
making judgments about intent or meaning, judges also consider the purpose of
the legislation, public policy, the constitution and whether the result is reason-
able. Id. §§ 45.09-45.12. With respect to the criterion of reasonableness, see
THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 496 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) ("The rules
of legal interpretation are rules of common sense, adopted by the courts in the
construction of the laws.") (emphasis in original).
167. SUTHERLAND, supra note 164, § 45.01, at 2. While courts generally ac-
cept this communicative model of statutes, many commentators reject it. See,
e.g., R. DwORKIN, LAw's EMPIRE 313-27 (1986) (criticizing "speaker's meaning"
theory of statutory construction, which supposes that statutes are an instance of
communication and that judges look to legislative history when a statute is not
clear to discover what state of mind legislators tried to communicate through
their votes).
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"legislative intent" approach emphasizes the meaning attached by the
sender, while the "meaning" inquiry focuses on the meaning attached
by the receiver. 1
Most courts traditionally have invoked fidelity to the legislature's
will to justify their interpretations. 169 The history of deference to the
legislature's will is as rich as it is interesting. One finds traces of the
notion in medieval philosophy170 and the struggle to establish the
supremacy of civil over celestial government, 17 1 in early modern polit-
168. SUTHERLAND, supra note 164, § 45.07, at 30, § 45.08, at 31.
169. Id. § 45.05, at 21. Fidelity to legislative intent remains the standard
most often declared by courts. See, e.g., Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622. 653 (1988)
(" 'The ultimate question is one of congressional intent, not whether this Court
thinks it can improve upon the statutory scheme that Congress enacted into
law.' ") (quoting Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 578 (1979));
Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843
(1984) (Court's function is to "give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent
of Congress"); Lavin v. Marsh, 644 F.2d 1378, 1380 (10th Cir. 1981) ("The stat-
utory scheme.., on first reading seems incredible. Nonetheless, this scheme
was promulgated by Congress and this court is bound to follow its letter absent
any indication that Congress intended otherwise."); Sunstein, Norms in Surprising
Places: The Case of Statutoty Interpretation, 100 ETHICS 803, 807-08 (1990) ("[T]he
most well known approach to the matter [of] statutory construction... sees the
courts as agents or servants of the legislature.").
170. Christian thought from the early Church through the middle ages was
thoroughly platonic. See P. TILLICH, A HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN THOUGHT 6, 78,
114 (C. Braaten ed. 1972) (influence of Plato and neo-platonism on Christian-
ity). The works of Plato's student and subsequent "rival," Aristotle, were virtu-
ally unknown to the Western world until the 13th century. See W. Ross,
ARISTOTLE 24 (2d ed. 1959) (Aristotle's withdrawal from Plato's influence);
Wick, Aristotelianism, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 148, 149 (1967) (Cat-
egoriae and De Interpretatione only works of Aristotle known in Europe before 12th
century). In 1169, Averroes (ibn-Rushd), a Spanish lawyer and Islamic philoso-
pher, commenced a vast series of commentaries on Aristotle's natural philoso-
phy. MacClintock, Averroes, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 220, 220 (1967).
His death coincided with the exponential acceleration of Western philosophy,
fueled in part by the translation of Aristotle's works into Latin and a reliance on
Averroes's commentaries for their study. Id.; see F. COPLESTON, A HISTORY OF
MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY 154 (Torchbook ed. 1974) (greatest impact on 13th cen-
tury thought was made by extended knowledge of aristotelianism); cf D. ALIGH-
IERI, DIVINE COMEDY, Inferno, IV, 144 (U. Ciardi trans. 1954) (referring to
"Averroes, of the Great Commentary").
Averroes influenced modern politics in two ways. First, his work caught the
attention of Frederick II of Sicily. MacClintock, Averroism, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY 223, 223 (1967). Frederick II, known as immutator mundi ("trans-
former of the world"), "not only defied the temporal power of the papacy but
fought it with the force of arms." H. BERMAN, supra note 46, at 425, 428. Sec-
ond, from about 1300 Averroism became associated with philosophical activity
in Italian universities, especially Padua. MacClintock, Averroism, supra, at 225. It
was there that a young student, Marsilio dei Mainardini (Marsilius of Padua), was
studying medicine. Gewirth, Marsilius of Padua, in 5 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSO-
PHY 166, 166 (1967). It was Marsilius's political theory that eventually was to
clinch the supremacy of civil government and to influence Anglo-American
jurisprudence.
171. Ironically, the likelihood of the Church realizing its aspirations to
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earthly governance began to falter in 1302 with Pope Boniface VIII's assertion:
"It is necessary to salvation that every human creature be subject to the Roman
pontiff." B. TUCHMAN, supra note 46, at 25 (quoting Unam Sanctam); cf. G. SAB-
INE, A HISTORY OF POLITICAL THEORY 287 (2d ed. 1950) (hostility to papal au-
thority enhanced by failure of Boniface's grandiose claims). The King of France,
Philip IV ("Philip the Fair"), responded the next year by ordering an assault on
the Pope. B. TUCHMAN, supra, at 25. Though the Pope was rescued, he died
shortly thereafter and through Philip's influence a Frenchman, Clement V, suc-
ceeded him and removed the Papacy to Avignon, where it flourished in a state of
"sumptuous pomp" under six French Popes in succession. Id. at 25-26; cf. D.
ALIGHIERI, DIVINE COMEDY, Paradiso, XXVII, 55-56 (A. Mandelbaum trans. 1982)
(St. Peter condemning French popes as "rapacious wolves clothed in the cloaks
of shepherds"); G. CHAUCER, The Pardoner's Tale, in THE CANTERBURY TALES 317
(Penguin Portable rev. ed. 1977) (satirizing clerical abuses).
In reaction to these papal indulgences and assertions of authority, Marsilius
published a political treatise in 1324. MARSILIUS OF PADUA, DEFENSOR PACIS
[DEFENDER OF PEACE] (A. Gewirth trans. 1951). The practical importance of his
aristotelian Averroism "can hardly be exaggerated." G. SABINE, supra, at 294; see
B. TUCHMAN, supra, at 37 (treatise was boldest'exponent of supremacy of state);
Gewirth, Marsilius of Padua, supra note 170, at 167 (Marsilius's crushing refuta-
tion completely reversed papal position). His theory is important as a form of
rudimentary positivism, that is, for the weight it gives "to the elements of com-
mand and sanction, the will of the legislator and his power to impose his will."
G. SABINE, supra, at 295. The source of legal authority is the legislature, and the
executive and judiciary are set up by the legislature to carry out its will. Id. at
296-97.
172. Some commentators have noted the influence Marsilius had on
Machievelli. See G. SABINE, supra note 171, at 303, 340. More important for
present purposes, however, is his influence on Hobbes. See id. at 303, 473. For
Hobbes, the law is what "the Common-wealth hath Commanded." T. HOBBES,
LEVIATHAN 137 (Head ed. 1651). The commonwealth acts through its represen-
tative, the sovereign, who is the sole legislator. Id. According to Hobbes, "Law-
yers are agreed.., that not the Letter (that is, every construction of it,) but that
which is according to the Intention of the Legislator, is the Law." Id. at 139.
All laws need to be interpreted, but not all interpretations are valid. The
authority of judges' interpretations is derived from their positions as agents of
the sovereign:
[It is] the authentique Interpretation of the Law (which is the sense of
the Legislator,) in which the nature of the Law consisteth; And there-
fore the Interpretation of all Lawes dependeth on the Authority Sover-
aign; and the Interpeters can be none but those, which the Soveraign
... shall appoint. For else, by the craft of an Interpeter, the Law may
be made to beare a sense, contrary to that of the Soveraign; by which
means the Interpreter becomes the Legislator.
Id. at 142-43.
According to one commentator, "Hobbes's theory of sovereignty brings to
completion the process of subordinating the church to the civil power which was
begun when Marsilio of Padua carried through to its logical conclusion the sepa-
ration of the spiritual and temporal authorities." G. SABINE, supra note 171, at
473. Hobbes's notion of the unlimited authority of the sovereign was prevalent
in early modern political philosophy. See I. KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS
OF JUSTICE § 49A, at 84 (J. Ladd trans. 1965) (1797); N. MACHIAVELLI, THE Dis-
COURSES Bk. 1, ch. 9, at 138 (Mod. Lib. ed. 1950) (1513);J. ROUSSEAU, ON THE
SOCIAL CONTRACT Bk. 2, chs. 1-5 in THE BASIC POLITICAL WRITINGS 153-60
(Hackett ed. 1987) (1762).
173. See Osborn v. United States Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 737, 866 (1824)
1990] NOTE 1207
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Today, the most common justification for the "legislative intent" stan-
dard is that the principle of separation of powers obliges the judiciary to
carry out the will of the legislature.1
74
The "meaning" standard does not enjoy as glorious a pedigree. Ar-
guably its best spokesperson was Justice Holmes, who remarked: "We
do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what the statute
means." 175 Perhaps his innovative approach derived from his skepti-
("Judicial power is... always [exercised] for the purpose of giving effect to the
will of the legislature .... ") (Marshall, C.J.); River Wear Comm'rs v. Adamson,
2 L.R. 743, 763 (1877) ("In all cases the object is to see what is the intention
expressed.") (Blackburn, L.); Heydon's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 637, 638 (Ex. 1584)
("[T]he office of all thejudges is always to make such construction... according
to the true intent of the makers .... ") (Coke, L.).
Early commentators continued to stress the Hobbesian idea that law
originates in the command of an absolute sovereign authority with the power to
sanction. See 1 J. AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OFJURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED Lecture
1 passim (1832); 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *49, *56-57. Likewise, they
continued to view the judicial function as one of merely implementing that com-
mand. See id. at *62 ("Law, without equity . . . is much more desirable for the
public good than equity without law; which would make every judge a legisla-
tor."); C. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRrr OF LAWS 182 (T. Nugent trans. 1873)
("UJ]udges are no more than the mouth that pronounces.., the law, mere pas-
sive beings[.]"). This approach has led to cases better described as infamous
than classic. See State v. Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 263, 268 (1829) ("[Tlhe Court
is compelled to declare, that.., until it shall seem fit to the Legislature to inter-
pose express enactments to the contrary, it will be the imperative duty of the
Judges to recognize the full dominion of the owner over the slave .... ").
174. See SUTHERLAND, supra note 164, § 45.05, at 21; see, e.g., Consolidated
Rail Corp. v. United States, 896 F.2d 574, 578 (D.C. Cir. 1990); United States v.
Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1366 n.8 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912
(1981); United States v. Loften, 518 F. Supp. 839, 853 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd,
819 F.2d 1130 (2d Cir. 1987); cf. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 303 (J. Madison) (C.
Rossiter ed. 1961) ("Were the power ofjudging joined with the legislative, the
life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control, for the judge
would then be the legislator.") (quoting Montesquieu) (emphasis in original); Sun-
stein, supra note 169, at 808 ("In a democratic system, one with separated pow-
ers, it is said to be impermissible for courts to invoke norms that cannot be
traced to an authoritative textual instrument.").
175. Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 417, 419
(1899), reprinted in OW. HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 207 (1920). For
modern examples of the "meaning" standard, see Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex
Co., 473 U.S. 479, 493-98 (1985) (Court may not add to statutory language but
must read statute as it is written); Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Director, Office of
Workers' Compensation Programs, United States Dep't of Labor, 606 F.2d
1324, 1330 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (MacKinnon, J., dissenting) ("The inquiry begins
not with conjecture about what Congress would have liked to have said when it
wrote the statute or with what Congress would say today given the chance, but
rather with what Congress indeed expressed in the statutory text."), rev'd, 449
U.S. 268 (1980); Youakim v. Miller, 562 F.2d 483 (7th Cir. 1977) (standard used
should be meaning of statute). For examples of the emphasis the "meaning"
standard places on the receiver of the statutory communication, see Fleming v.
McCurtain, 215 U.S. 56, 60 (1909) ("The word was addressed to the Indian
mind.") (Holmes,J.); Akins v. Saxbe, 380 F. Supp. 1210 (D. Me. 1974) (language
of statutes and treaties affecting Indians must be construed as Indians them-
selves would have understood it).
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cism about the doctrinal abstractions of separated powers; he believed it
useful to insist "on a more conscious recognition of the legislative func-
tion of the courts." 1 76 Whatever its source, Holmes's preference for the
"meaning" standard influenced modem jurisprudence.177
A word of caution is in order, lest one oversimplify the contrast be-
tween the two justificatory standards. Under either standard, the in-
quiry always concerns a single act of communication-the statute.
Although there are two parties to every communication, they are closely
related. If the sender desires to be understood, she will employ lan-
guage whose meaning is familiar to the receiver. Similarly, if the re-
ceiver desires to understand the communication, he will consider what
the sender might have intended. Because each party to an act of com-
munication considers the other party in performing his own role, what
"is primarily relevant to the question of what a legislature intended is
also secondarily relevant to the question of what a statute means to
others, and vice versa." 178 In other words, an inquiry into legislative
intent takes as evidence the meaning of the words that the legislature
used. So, for example, the Court has declared: "The language of the
statute is clear, and we have historically assumed that Congress intended
what it enacted." 179 Where the legislature's intent can be read off of the
statute's language, further inquiry is unnecessary.' 8 0
176. O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 36 (1881).
177. See Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384, 397
(1951) (Jackson, J., concurring); Frankfurter, Some Reflections of the Reading of Stat-
utes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 538 (1947) ("All these years I have avoided speak-
ing of the 'legislative intent' and I shall continue to be on my guard against using
it.") (remarks at Meeting of Ass'n of Bar of City of New York, Mar. 18, 1947),
rerrinted in LANDMARKS OF LAw 210, 221 (R. Henson ed. 1960); see also Fein,
Scalia's Way, A.B.A.J., Feb. 1990, at 38 (dramatic alteration in Court's method of
statutory interpretation, attributed mainly to justice Scalia's presence on bench).
In his suspicion of reliance on legislative history in interpreting statutes, Justice
Scalia is akin to Justice Frankfurter. Compare United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S.
326, 345 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (Congress passed what text of statute
plainly said, not what few congressmen said it said) and INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,
480 U.S. 421, 453 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) (where language is clear, Court
is not free to replace it with unenacted legislative intent) with Frankfurter, supra,
at 543, LANDMARKS OF LAw, at 225 ("Spurious use of legislative history must not
swallow the legislation so as to give point to the quip that only when legislative
history is doubtful do you go to the statute.").
178. SUTHERLAND, supra note 164, § 45.13, at 69; cf. Lynch v. Donelly, 465
U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("The meaning of a statement
to its audience depends both on the intention of the speaker and on the 'objec-
tive' meaning of the statement in the community.").
179. United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980);
see G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 872 F.2d 648, 668 (7th Cir.
1989) (Manion,J., dissenting) ("[A] rule's words are meant to convey a meaning
to those who read the rule. This court should give the drafters credit for being
able to communicate what they actually intended.").
180. See, e.g., Davis v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 109 S. Ct. 1500, 1504 n.3
(1989) (if language is unambiguous, plain meaning of statute is given effect and
legislative history is irrelevant); Moore v. Raine, 907 F.2d 1476, 1478 (4th Cir.
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The interrelatedness of the twojustificatory standards indicates that
rarely will adoption of one over the other determine the outcome of a
court's interpretive process. Instead, the standards principally affect the
relevance of the evidence and the persuasiveness of the arguments of-
fered by the parties before the court.' 8l It is customary to divide the
evidence and arguments offered in cases of statutory construction into
two categories, labelled "intrinsic" and "extrinsic."18 2 The intrinsic cat-
egory includes arguments based on the structure of the statute and on
the meaning of its words. These arguments are most persuasive before
a court that adopts the "meaning" standard for justification of its inter-
pretations. Because this standard focuses on the receiver of the commu-
nication, and the receiver of a statutory communication is the general
community, the arguments will often appeal to objective indicia of con-
ventional meaning, such as dictionary definitions and maxims of inter-
pretation that generalize from ordinary language usage.' 83 The
extrinsic category, in contrast, consists of arguments based on factors
external to the text of the statute. These arguments are most persuasive
before a court that adopts the "intent" standard for justification of its
interpretations. Because this standard focuses on the sender of the
communication, and the sender of a statutory communication is the en-
acting legislature, the arguments will often appeal to subjective indicia
of what the legislature "had in mind" when it enacted the statute, such
as specific statements in the legislative history and the relationship to
other statutes enacted by the same legislature.' 8 4
2. The Court's Interpretation
The theory of interpretation suggests, and the practice of courts
confirms, that the distinction between the "meaning" and "intent" stan-
dards often is far from lucid. The Mallard Court's interpretive strategy
was no exception. The Court first purported to establish the "plain
meaning" of the term request.18 5 The Court then determined that Con-
1990) (same); United States v. Brian N., 900 F.2d 218, 221 (10th Cir. 1990)
(same); Moodie v. School Book Fairs, Inc., 889 F.2d 739, 743 (7th Cir. 1989)
(same) (Wisconsin law); Standing Deer v. Carlson, 831 F.2d 1525, 1530 (9th Cir.
1987) (same).
181. See SUTHERLAND, supra note 164, § 45.08, at 33, § 45.13, at 69.
182. Id. § 45.14, at 70. The labels refer to the text of the statute.
183. See id. § 45.08, at 32-33, § 45.14, at 70; see, e.g., Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at
1818 (Court cites four dictionaries in support of its interpretation of request).
184. See SUTHERLAND, supra note 164, at § 45.08, at 31-32, § 45.14, at 70.
185. Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1818. The majority used the phrase "plain
meaning" only once, and that was not in the context of the first-stage, defini-
tional, portion of the opinion. See id. at 1821. It did, however, refer to the
"plain" "import" of the term request, to the term's "ordinar[y] use[]," to its use
"[i]n everyday speech," to its "most common meaning" and to its "ordinary and
natural signification." Id. at 1818. In addition, Justice Stevens viewed the ma-
jority as engaging in "the parsing of the plain meaning of the word 'request.' "
1210 [Vol. 35: p. 1175
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gress intended this meaning when it enacted section 1915(d).18 6 Each
of these steps requires examination.
a. The "Meaning" Standard
To interpret the meaning of section 1915(d), it was necessary that
the Court interpret its language. '8 7 The "operative term" in the statute,
and that to which the Court limited its interpretation, was request.18 8 To
engage in a search for the "plain meaning" of a word is to risk a charge
of serious misunderstanding of the nature of language. '8 9 It was not the
Court's tactic, however, to decide on the meaning of request, but rather to
reach a negative definition-to distinguish it from require, assign and ap-
point.190 In this sense, the Court professed only to establish the "plain
Id, at 1823 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Therefore, this Note will use the phrase
plain meaning to denote that which the Court sought to establish.
186. Id at 1818.
187. Id ("Interpretation of a statute must begin with the statute's
language.").
188. Id.
189. The charge that a search for the meaning of "a word" simply demon-
strates a misunderstanding of language is levied from many camps, but the fol-
lowing passage clearly articulates its substance.
Any sophisticated theorist of language would point out that the meain-
ing of an utterance isn't a function of the words themselves or even of
sentences, but of the use to which the words and sentences are put by
speakers and writers.... Meaning is an affair of the use of words and
sentences, not of words and sentences considered as things-in-them-
selves which somehow bear meanings within them.... [Sltrictly speak-
ing, no word or sentence means anything determinate until it is used in
a specific situation by somebody, until it is employed in a speech act.
Graff, Keep off the Grass, Drop Dead, and Other Indeterminacies: A Response to Sanford
Levinson, 60 TEX. L. REV. 405, 407 (1982) (responding to Levinson, Law as Litera-
ture, 60 TEX. L. REV. 373 (1982)). Both Professor Graff's and Professor Levin-
son's works are reprinted in INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE (S. Levinson &
S. Mailloux eds. 1988). For a thoughtful discussion of recent movements in the
theory of interpretation, see Patterson, Interpretation in Law-Toward a Reconstruc-
tion of the Current Debate, 29 VILL. L. REV. 671 (1984).
Most commentators view the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein as the progeni-
tor of the slogan "meaning is use." See Wofford, The Blinding Light: The Uses of
Histoty in Constitutional Interpretation, 31 U. CHI. L. REV. 502, 512 & n.34 (1964)
(tracing Wittgenstein's influence on philosophers of language). For more recent
and detailed work on the implications of Wittgensteinian philosophy of lan-
guage, see TRUTH AND INTERPRETATION: PERSPECTIVES ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF
DONALD DAVIDSON (Lepore ed. 1984). For a brief but skillful application of
Wittgensteinian theory, see R. RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY AND SOLIDARITY ch.
1 (1989).
190. See Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1818-21. It is possible to read the opinion as
concerned with positive definition; it offers ask, petition and entreat as synonyms of
request. ld. at 1818. In defense of its interpretation of § 1915(d), the Court
might have proceeded to offer examples of how Congress understood and used
the verb request. But in subsequent portions of the opinion, the Court consist-
ently resorts to historical examples of the usage of the terms appoint and assign
and relies on the absence of the term request in those contexts to justify its inter-
pretation. Id. at 1818-21.
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use" of the term, and to show that it did not equate with the use of those
other terms.191
Nevertheless, it is not clear that the Court, by basing its analysis on
the "plain use" of the term, overcame any of the problems associated
with a search for "plain meaning." For example, suppose an interpreter
inquires into the meaning of to check. If she accepts the "meaning is use"
philosophy, the inquiry will turn to the use of the term. But what is the
term's "plain use"? Is it the use made by a chess player? a hockey
player? a coat-room attendant? To derive meaning from use, it is nec-
essary to select a relevant context of use. 192
The context appropriate to Mallard is that of a judge requesting an
attorney to represent a litigant.' 93 Both Justice Kennedy and Justice
Stevens, throughout their opinions, considered the term in this con-
text. 194 The majority, however, considered the term in this context only
191. See id. at 1818. The Court did offer synonyms for the term request. See
supra note 190. Nevertheless, the Court's reasoning did not depend on finding
an agreed-upon meaning that could be substituted for the verb to request. Thus,
the Court did not ignore the fact that meaning is use. For a discussion of the
idea that meaning is use, see supra note 189. Instead, the Court reached a defini-
tion of how the verb request was used. That is, the Court proceeded in its inquiry
equipped with an adjective-"precatory"-to describe the "ordinary and natural
signification" of the use of the verb to request. Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1818. Be-
yond this "ordinary use," however, the Court did not offer any example of the
use of request other than its use in § 1915(d). Id. at 1821.
192. See Graff, supra note 189, at 407 ("[N]o word or sentence means any-
thing determinate until it is used in a specific situation by somebody[.J") (empha-
sis added). It is necessary to select a relevant context of use because words are
used differently, that is, have different meanings, in different contexts. See
Schauer, An Essay on Constitutional Language, 29 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 797, 799-800
(1982) ("If... meaning is use, then legal use ought to produce different mean-
ings than a physicist's use, a sociologist's use, or the use of the man on the
Clapham omnibus.") (citations omitted).
193. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1988) ("The court may request an attorney to
represent any such person unable to employ counsel .. "). Indeed, prior opin-
ions suggest that in this context some Justices understood the term as synony-
mous with appoint. See Welch v. Smith, 484 U.S. 903, 903 (1987) (White, J.,
dissenting) ("[P]etitioners brought their actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and
sought appointment of counsel under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).") (emphasis added);
Hyman v. Rickman, 446 U.S. 989, 989 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
("Although granting leave to proceed informa pauperis, [the district] court failed
to act upon petitioner's motion under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d), for the appointment of
counsel.") (emphasis added).
194. See Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1823 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 1826
(Stevens, J., dissenting). In the context of a court requesting an attorney to rep-
resent a litigant, both Justice Kennedy and Justice Stevens interpreted request as
more than simply "precatory." Justice Kennedy stated that "[a]ccepting a
court's request to represent the indigent is one of [a lawyer's] traditional obliga-
tions." Id. at 1823 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Stevens insisted that "a
formal request to a lawyer by the court pursuant to [a fair and detailed] proce-
dure is tantamount to a command." Id. at 1826 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Cf
Stewart, supra note 158, at 48 ("[Flew lawyers take [the] view that a request from
a federal judge is precatory[.]").
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in the sixth defense of its interpretation. 19 5 There the Court conceded
that the term request might have a meaning different than "merely preca-
tory," the plain-use meaning identified earlier.' 96 The Court advanced
the amorphous notion of the "appropriate request,"' 9 7 which presuma-
bly hovers somewhere between "merely precatory" and the stronger
"respectfully command" that Justice Stevens would have adopted.' 9 8
H.L.A. Hart has noted that "the natural expressions [of impera-
tives] are coloured by the special features of the different situations in
which they are normally used."'199 The disagreement among the Jus-
tices was over what "color" to give to the term request in this particular
situation. Significantly, Hart identifies as one classification of impera-
tives the "mere request," which is "addressed by the speaker to one who
is able to render him a service, [without] suggestion either of any great
urgency or any hint of what may follow on failure to comply."'2° ° Hart
gives as an example, "Pass the salt, please. °2 0 1 This is the sense re-
flected injustice Brennan's plain-use definition, "merely precatory." At
the opposite end of the spectrum Hart identifies ordering: "to secure
compliance with his expressed wishes, the speaker threatens to do some-
thing which a normal man would regard as harmful or unpleasant. °2 0 2
Hart employs the example of a gunman saying to a bank clerk, "Hand
over the money or I will shoot."2 0 3
Quite clearly, the majority rejected this sense. But so, too, did the
dissent. Justice Stevens allowed that, unlike the bank clerk held at gun-
point, an attorney could decline a case upon offering good reason for
195. See Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1821. In its sixth defense, the Court rejected
the district court's argument that construing § 1915(d) to allow judges to ask but
not compel attorneys to serve rendered the statute a nullity. Id. The Court went
only so far as to say that the judge-attorney context made the request "appropri-
ate," as opposed to "improper." For a discussion of the Court's sixth defense,
see supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
196. See Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1821.
197. Id. The Court opined that § 1915(d) "plays a useful role in the statu-
tory scheme if it informs lawyers that the court's requests are appropriate re-
quests, hence not to be ignored in the mistaken belief that they are improper,
like a judge's request to cut short cross-examination so that he can go fishing."
Id. (emphasis in original).
198. Id. at 1826 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens found "no sub-
stance to the Court's speculation that Congress enacted [§ 1915(d)] because of a
concern that a court's requests . . . might otherwise be 'disregarded in the mis-
taken belief that they are improper.' " Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting the
majority opinion at 1821). Justice Stevens stated that "in context, [he] would...
construe the word 'request' as used in § 1915(d) as meaning 'respectfully com-
mand.' " Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
199. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 235 (1961). Hart recognized that
the social situation and relationships of the parties influence whether an impera-
tive properly should be classified as an order, a plea, etc. Id. at 234-35.
200. Id. at 18 (emphasis in original).
201. Id.
202. Id. at 19.
203. Id.
12131990] NOTE
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doing so. 204 Justice Kennedy also refused to give this sense to the term.
The language he chose to depict the position he rejected-"require-
ments of the law" and "the law demands" 205-captures the coercive na-
ture of the gunman situation. If that were the end of the matter, we
would not have three opinions and a 5-4 decision. It is not the end of
the matter, however, because we have not exhausted the varieties of im-
peratives. There is much ground between a mere request and an order,
between "Pass the salt, please" and "Hand over the money or I will
shoot." Each of the opinions recognized this ground: the majority with
its "appropriate request"; the concurrence with its professional "re-
sponsibility," "obligation" and "duty"; and the dissent with its "respect-
fully command." The tension in the case arose from defining exactly
what this form of imperative required.
In Hart's scheme, this form of imperative is a command, a word which
carries with it very strong implications that there is a relatively
stable hierarchical organization . . . in which the commander
occupies a position of pre-eminence .... [I]t need not be the
case, where a command is given, that there should be latent
threat of harm in the event of disobedience. To command is
characteristically to exercise authority over men, not power to
inflict harm, and though it may be combined with threats of
harm a command is primarily an appeal not to fear but to re-
spect for authority. 20 6
It is fairly simple to construe the facts of Mallard in terms of Hart's de-
scription. The bar represents the hierarchical organization. A judge,
occupying the position of pre-eminence, issues commands. To be sure,
judges do have the power to sanction attorneys, but it is not unreasona-
ble to suppose that most members of the bar obey most judges' com-
mands out of respect for authority, not because they fear the harm
associated with noncompliance. This interpretation captures what is
common to the three opinions-the recognition that, no matter what
term is used to describe the action, a judge's request of an attorney de-
rives considerable force simply from the context in which it is made.
The divisive issue, of course, was how much force? The answer
turns on how accurately the description in the previous paragraph char-
acterizes the profession. The holding in Mallard reveals a more honest
understanding of the current state of the profession than does the por-
trayal in the previous paragraph, which unduly depicts the bar as a ho-
mogeneous, "relatively stable hierarchical organization." For this
reason at least, the result in the case was correct.
204. See Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1823, 1825 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
205. Id. at 1823 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
206. H.L.A. HART, supra note 199, at 20. For an alternative analysis of the
logic of imperatives issued in the legal context, see Morris, Imperatives and Orders,
26 THEORIA 183 (1960).
1.214 [Vol. 35: p. 1175
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The result was correct because gone are the days of the cliquish,
almost metaphysical entity reverently known as THE BAR. The bar's
priestly characteristics have succumbed to the two primary hallmarks of
the modem American landscape, liberalism2 0 7 and market econom-
ics. 20 8 The liberal impulse disfavors the bar's traditionally exclusionary
practices. The modem profession's ranks have swelled so dramati-
cally 2° 9 that it is nearly impossible to attribute to any one of its members
qua member any single quality, other than having graduated from law
school and having passed an exam. Increased membership in the pro-
fession has brought with it an increase of diversity, both in
demographics 2 10 and in viewpoints.2 1' The economic forces of our
207. "Liberalism" has many meanings. Here it is used primarily to de-
scribe a commitment to freedom and equality and an opposition to unjustified
privilege. In this sense, the civil rights and women's movements were liberal
phenomena. A slightly different but related-and more specific to the law-
form of liberalism is found in the works of Bentham and Marx, who, despite
their vast differences, agreed on the fundamental point "that human society and
its legal structure which had worked so much misery, had been protected from
criticism by myths, mysteries, and illusions, not all of them intentionally gener-
ated, yet all of them profitable to interested parties." H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS ON
BENTHAM 25-26 (1982).
208. See, e.g., Goldberg, Then and Now: 75 Years of Change, A.B.A. J., Jan.
1990, at 56, 58 (" 'The market forces that affect everyone have caught up with
lawyers .... ') (quoting Professor Stephen Gillers of New York University Law
School).
209. In the single decade of the 1970s, as many people graduated from law
school as had in the previous 100 years. D'Alemberte, Talbot D'Alemberte on Legal
Education, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1990, at 52.
210. Until the beginning of this century, the legal profession was over-
whelmingly Protestant, white and male. Abel, The Contradictions of Professionalism,
in 1 LAWYERS IN SociE.TY: THE COMMON LAW WORLD 200-05 (R. Abel & P. Lewis
eds. 1988). Exclusion ofJews and Catholics began to crumble by the 1930s. Id.
at 201. Some law schools excluded blacks until the late 1950s and women as late
as 1972. Id. at 202-03. The number of women in ABA-accredited law schools
has grown from 1700 in 1963 to 53,000 in 1990. Goldberg, Bridging the Gap,
A.B.A. J., Sept. 1990, at 44, 45-46. Women currently account for 42.7% of the
student population at ABA-approved schools. Lempinen, A Student Challenge to
the Old Guard, STUDENT LAW., Sept. 1990, at 12, 16. For a discussion of the posi-
tive impact the increased number of women may have on the profession, see
Schafran, Lawyers' Lives, Clients' Lives: Can Women Liberate the Profession?, 34 VILL.
L. REV. 1105 (1989). Despite these gains by traditionally excluded groups,
much remains to be done. Even today, whites account for 87.4% of the enroll-
ment in ABA-accredited law schools. Lempinen, supra, at 16.
211. A glaring example of the diversity within the bar is the recent contro-
versy over the ABA's adoption in February 1990 of Resolution 106(c), which
supported a woman's right to choose to have an abortion. See Resolution 106(c)
Revisited, A.B.A. J., July 1990, at 8, 8-10 (letters to editor); The Battle Continues,
A.B.A.J., May 1990, at 10, 10-12 (letters to editor). The divisiveness of the issue
recently led the ABA to rescind the resolution. See Marcotte, ABA Neutral on
Abortion, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1990, at 30. One may argue that the abortion contro-
versy divides the general public, and that the bar is no exception. But that is
exactly the point: the bar is more like a sample of the general public than it is a
homogeneous body that thinks and acts with one mind. Moreover, members of
the bar divide over more than just the abortion issue. See, e.g., Keller v. State Bar
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consumer-oriented market society have had a similarly tumultuous im-
pact on the modern legal profession. A recurring controversy concerns
the extent to which attorneys should have at their disposal options avail-
able to other market participants. 2 12 Market forces have altered not
only what lawyers do,215 but also the ways in which they do it.214
The result of the changes wrought by liberalization and the pres-
sure of market forces is a profession markedly different from the body
presupposed by Hart's definition of a command. This is not to say that
attorneys do not respect judges, nor that they do not often respond out
of that respect. Rather, it suggests that only a slight exaggeration would
of Cal., 110 S. Ct. 2228 (1990) (successful challenge to use of mandatory bar
membership fees to finance controversial political activities).
212. Important for any market participant is the ability to communicate
with consumers. See P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 43 (11 th ed. 1980) ("In the ide-
alized model of an efficiently acting competitive market mechanism, consumers
are supposed to be well informed."). Attorneys' recent efforts to secure this
ability, or at least aspects of it, generally have succeeded. See Peel v. Attorney
Disciplinary Comm'n of Ill., 110 S. Ct. 2281 (1990) (reversing sanctions against
attorney whose letterhead stated that he held "Certificate in Trial Advocacy");
Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988) (striking down prohibition
of targeted solicitation of business by mail); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary
Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985) (striking down prohibitions on illustrations in ad-
vertising and on solicitations of business with respect to specific legal problems);
In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982) (holding unconstitutional a variety of restric-
tions on lawyer advertising, including restrictions to certain categories of infor-
mation and, in some instances, to certain specified language); In re Primus, 436
U.S. 412 (1978) (reversing reprimand of attorney who wrote to potential plain-
tiff in suit); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (holding unconstitu-
tional prohibitions on lawyers' price advertising of routine legal services).
More recent controversies concern ownership interests in and of law firms.
See Law Firm Partnerships, A.B.A. J., May 1990, at 38 (debate over propriety of
permitting non-lawyers to become equity partners in law firms); Noah, Washing-
ton's Plan to Let Lobbyists Be Partners in Law Firms Strikes Some Lawyers As Appalling,
Wall St. J., Apr. 27, 1990, at A14, col. 1 (report on controversy of permitting
non-lawyers to become equity partners in law firm); Cohen & Marcus, Limits on
Law-Firm Diversification Urged, Wall St. J., Feb. 12, 1990, at B5, col. 1 (extent to
which law firms can diversify into areas beyond practice of law).
213. The proportion of lawyers in private practice fell from nearly 90% in
1948 to roughly 66% in 1980. Abel, supra note 210, at 228. Attorneys today
may instead choose to become government employees, in-house counsel, law
professors or politicians. A related phenomenon within private practice is the
stratification between "elite" and "ordinary" lawyers. Id. at 232 ("[E]lite law-
yers represent only large business clients and extremely wealthy individuals,
whereas ordinary lawyers represent small businesses and middle-class individu-
als."); see also Goldberg, supra note 208, at 61 (" 'The things we [lawyers] work
on run the full gamut of society from domestic relations to international arms
control. No other vocation has the same scope.' ") (quoting Professor Geoffrey
Hazard of Yale Law School).
214. The most significant recent change has been the rise of the
"megafirm." See generally Gibbons, Law Practice in 2001, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1990, at
69 (describing recent changes and discussing predictions of future structure of
law practice); cf K. EISLER, SHARK TANK: GREED, POLITICS, AND THE COLLAPSE OF
FINLEY, KUMBLE, ONE OF AMERICA'S LARGEST LAw FIRMS (1990) (entertaining
chronicle of demise of one large firm).
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be involved in comparing the facts of Mallard, in which an attorney pri-
marily serving creditor and corporate interests was expected to handle a
civil rights suit simply because he was a member of the bar, to expecting
a podiatrist to perform heart surgery simply because she was a physi-
cian. The Court's holding may be understood as a response to the new
realities of the profession. This interpretation of Mallard may explain
how Justice Brennan, often criticized by his more conservative brethren
for "result oriented" jurisprudence that strayed beyond the text of a
statute,2 15 came to author the majority opinion for them. In this case it
did not matter that his usual allies perhaps did not perceive the legal
profession's changing social conditions, since he was able to respond to
the changes with the type of literalist analysis that attracted the con-
servative Justices.
b. The Intent Defense
The Court was not content to rely solely on the "plain meaning" of
request. Instead, it offered six defenses of why its interpretation of the
term was the "correct" one, i.e., the one that Congress intended.21 6
This Note addresses the first 21 7 and sixth218 defenses.
(1) Mandatory and Directory Construction
The Court took its first defense to be "[p]erhaps the clearest proof
that Congress did not intend [section] 1915(d) to license compulsory
appointment. '219 The Court noted Congress's use of shall in subsection
(c) and its failure to employ the term in subsection (d).220 Based on this
difference in vocabulary, the Court concluded that Congress's "decision
to allow federal courts to request attorneys to represent impoverished liti-
gants, rather than command, as in the case of court officers, that lawyers
shall or must take on cases assigned to them, bespeaks an intent not to
authorize mandatory appointments of counsel."'2 2'
215. See, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979). In Mal-
lard, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Scalia supported Justice
Brennan's interpretive method; the same three Justices have rejected his Weber
approach. ChiefJustice Rehnquist dissented in Weber. Justice White, who joined
the majority in that case, has since recanted and stated that he would overrule it.
Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 657 (1987) (White, J., dissent-
ing). Justice Scalia came on the Court after it decided Weber, but he has since
written a scathing criticism of it. Id. at 669-77 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
216. For a list of the majority's defenses of its interpretation of request, see
supra note 93.
217. For a discussion of the first defense of the Court's interpretation of
request, see supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
218. For a discussion of the sixth defense of the Court's interpretation of
request, see supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text.
219. Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1818.
220. Id.
221. Id.
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The first defense does not support the Court's interpretation of re-
quest as that term is used in subsection (d). Ordinarily, a distinction is
drawn between the terms shall and may.2 22 This distinction is the rele-
vant one to draw between subsections (c) and (d). Subsection (c) speaks
to officers of the court and witnesses, and its message is that they have
no discretion, that they "shall" do something. In contrast, subsection
(d) speaks to the court, and its message is that the court has discretion, it
"may" request counsel to serve. The difference in Congress's word-
choice indicates only that it did not intend to require the court to make the
request of an attorney.
But subsection (d) is silent as to what an attorney may do once a
court has exercised its discretion to make the request. The subsection
does not use attorney as a subject; it does not ascribe an action to an
attorney and a fortiori does not grant or withhold discretion as to an
action. The Court's comparison of shall and request offers little evidence
of congressional intent. The best evidence would result not from the
use of a different term in subsection (d), but from the use of a different
sentence structure. Congress could have stated "an attorney may" or
"an attorney shall." Since it did neither, the most reasonable interpreta-
tion of congressional intention that the subsection yields is simply that
Congress did not even consider what an attorney would do. Therefore,
the first defense does not "bespeak[] an intent not to authorize
mandatory appointments of counsel." 223 Rather, it "bespeaks" no in-
tent at all.
(2) The "Whole Statute" Defense
A fundamental principle of statutory construction is that a statute
should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions. 224 The
district court advanced this principle in its argument that section
1915(d) authorized appointment of counsel, and in addressing it the
Court came dangerously close to what it wanted to avoid-addressing
the issue of a court's inherent power to appoint counsel. The district
court had put forth the premise that "statutory authorization is unneces-
222. One authority has stated that " 'may' is chiefly used to express permis-
sion or possibility. [When] may [is] used to express permission .. . [in the]
second or third persons[,] ... the speaker is giving... permission." A. THOM-
SON & A. MARTINET, A PRACTICAL ENGLISH GRAMMAR 113 (3rd ed. 1980).
In contrast, " 'shall' in the second and third persons is used to express (A)
the subject's intention to perform a certain action or to cause it to be performed,
and (B) a command.... [(B)] is chiefly used in regulations or legal documents."
Id. at 204.
223. Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1818.
224. See, e.g., Bell v. NewJersey, 461 U.S. 773, 788-89 (1983); Fidelity Fed.
Savings & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 163 (1982); American Tex-
tile Mfrs. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 513 (1981); Knutzen v. Eben Ezer Lutheran
Hous. Center, 815 F.2d 1343, 1348-49 (10th Cir. 1987); Office of Consumers'
Counsel v. FERC, 783 F.2d 206, 219-20 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
1218 [Vol. 35: p. 1175
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sary for a court simply to ask an attorney to represent someone. ' 22 5
The Court refused to accept that premise, stating that "statutory provi-
sions may simply codify existing rights or powers."122 6 As an example,
the Court noted that section 1915(d) "authorizes courts to dismiss a
'frivolous or malicious' action, but there is little doubt they would have
power to do so even in the absence of this statutory provision. '2 27
225. Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1821. For a discussion of the district court's
argument, and of the Court's rejection of it, see supra notes 112-15 and accom-
panying text.
226. Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1821.
227. Id. In a case decided the same day as Mallard, the Court also clarified
the standard for dismissal under § 1915(d). See Neitzke v. Williams, 109 S. Ct.
1827 (1989), aff'g Williams v. Faulkner, 837 F.2d 304 (7th Cir. 1988). Section
1915(d) permits a federal judge to dismiss a case if satisfied that the action is
"frivolous or malicious." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1988). In a unanimous opinion
authored by Justice Marshall, the Neizke Court held that a complaint which fails
to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is not automati-
cally frivolous within the meaning of § 1915(d). Neitzke, 109 S. Ct. at 1829.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals had held that the frivolousness stan-
dard was more lenient than the Rule 12(b)(6) standard. Id. at 1830 (citing Wil-
liams v. Faulkner, 837 F.2d 304, 307 (7th Cir. 1988)). The court stated that a
suit should be dismissed for frivolousness only if the litigant "cannot make any
rational argument in law or fact which would entitle him or her to relief." Id
Therefore, unless the complaint "indisputably" lacks any factual or legal basis,
the court should permit the claim in a close case "to proceed at least to the point
where responsive pleadings are required." l
In affirming the Seventh Circuit's reading of the statute, Justice Marshall
noted that Rule 12(b)(6) and § 1915(d) were designed to serve different ends.
Id. at 1832. The Court stated that Rule 12(b)(6) "streamlines" litigation by au-
thorizing a court to assume the truth of a complaint's factual allegations and to
dismiss it if as a matter of law "no relief could be granted under any set of facts
consistent with the allegations." Id. (citing Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S.
69, 73 (1984)). Because the plaintiff ordinarily has notice of the pending Rule
12(b)(6) motion, she has an opportunity to amend the complaint before the ac-
tion is dismissed. Id. at 1834.
The role of § 1915(d) is not to "streamline" litigation, but to "discourage
the filing of, and waste ofjudicial and private resources upon, baseless lawsuits
that paying litigants generally do not initiate .... " Id. at 1832-33. That is,
§ 1915(d) "replicat[es] the function of screening out inarguable claims which is
played in the realm of paid cases by financial considerations." Id. at 1833. To-
ward this end, the "frivolous" standard authorizes a court not only to dismiss an
action if it is based on an "indisputably meritless legal theory," as Rule 12(b)(6)
does, but also "to pierce the veil of the complaint's factual allegations" and dis-
miss the claim if its "factual contentions are clearly basesless." Id. In addition,
the court may dismiss the claim sua sponte; thus the plaintiff lacks the proce-
dural protection afforded to paying plaintiffs under Rule 12(b)(6). Id. at 1834.
In short, not only do Rule 12(b)(6) and § 1915(d) serve different ends, but
they also employ different means toward their respective ends. Id. at 1833-34.
The means employed by § 1915(d) give to a court more power to examine and
to dismiss a claim than do those employed by Rule 12(b)(6). Id. at 1833. Inter-
pretation of the extent of these differences must be checked, however, against
the legislative purpose of § 1915, which is "to assure equality of consideration
for all litigants." Id. (citing Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 447
(1962)). Because indigent litigants already have a more difficult time proceeding
in federal court under § 1915(d), the Court condoned the Seventh Circuit's
1990] NOTE 1219
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From this example one might infer that courts do have the inherent
authority to appoint counsel. That is, just as a court would have the
power to dismiss a frivolous suit in the absence of section 1915(d), so
too it would have the power to compel an attorney to represent an indi-
gent litigant. The Court was aware of this reading, but deftly used it to
the advantage of its own interpretation of request as used in section
1915(d). First, the Court denied that it was reaching the question of a
court's inherent authority.228 Second, the Court employed an indirect
argument that allegedly demonstrated that the respondent would have
to agree that the statute did not function to confer upon a court the
power to appoint counsel. 229
The Court's indirect argument was of the form commonly referred
to as reductio ad absurdum. The method is indirect because in order to
prove something one assumes its contradictory, 23 0 derives a contradic-
tion 25' from it and then concludes that what one wished to prove is
true.232 It rests on the principle that if from a proposition P a logical
contradiction may be deduced, then P cannot be true; thus, not-P is
true.233 Its symbolic form is (P -+ -P) -- + -p. 23 4
One logician has noted that the method "is easy to understand,
though a little difficult to state precisely."123 5 It is all the more difficult
to state precisely the Court's reductio, because it contained a second
reductio within it.2 36 Before examining it in detail, here is a condensed
choice of the "more lenient" "no rational basis in law or fact" standardover the
Rule 12(b)(6) "failure to state a claim" standard. Id. at 1830. To do otherwise,
the Court concluded, would "deny indigent plaintiffs the practical protections
against unwarranted dismissal generally accorded paying plaintiffs under the
Federal Rules." Id. at 1834.
228. Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1821 n.8.
229. Id. This indirect argument will be referred to in the text as the "pri-
mary reductio." For the structure of this argument, see infra notes 230-59 and
accompanying text.
230. A proposition and its negation are contradictories of one another. B.
MATES, ELEMENTARY LOGIC 119 n.* (2d ed. 1972).
231. A contradiction is a conjunction whose conjuncts are contradictories,
for example, Q and not Q. E. LEMMON, BEGINNING LOGIC 26 (1978).
232. B. MATES, supra note 230, at 120.
233. E. LEMMON, supra note 231, at 26. One of the three "laws of thought"
is the principle of contradiction: no statement can be both true and false. I.
CopI, INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC 306 (7th ed. 1986). This is the principle upon
which reduction ad absurdum rests; if a proposition P leads to a violation of the
principle, it cannot be true. If the proposition cannot be true, then it is false.
This conclusion follows from another "law of thought," the principle of the ex-
cluded middle: any statement is either true or false. Id.
234. See D. KALISH, R. MONTAGUE & G. MAR, LOGIC: TECHNIQUES OF FOR-
MA. REASONING 43 (2d ed. 1980). --* is a conditional sign. P -+ Q roughly trans-
lates into ordinary language as if P then Q. & is a conjunction sign which
translates as and. - is a negation sign which translates as not. The method has
various forms. Another one is: (P -+ Q) & (P -- - QJ -- - P. Id. at 66.
235. E. LEMMON, supra note 231, at 26.
236. This second reductio will be referred to in the text as the "internal reduc-
1220
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version of the argument. The Court wanted to conclude that section
1915(d) did not confer coercive authority on federal courts. The district
court argued that it did. For the sake of the argument, the Court as-
sumed that it did, thereby adopting the contradictory of what it wanted
to prove. The district court also argued that federal courts possess in-
herent authority for coercive appointment. 23 7 For the sake of the argu-
ment, the Court also assumed that was true. The Court next launched
its internal reductio: if courts did have inherent authority to appoint
counstl, "then by respondent's reasoning 23 8 § 1915(d) would have been
otiose;23 9 respondent would therefore have to conclude, it seems, that
the federal courts lacked inherent authority."' 240 The Court then com-
pleted the primary reductio: if the district court's argument about section
1915(d) were correct, "it would seriously undermine [the] assertion that
the federal courts possess inherent power to direct unwilling lawyers to
serve." 241 But the district court would not want its assertion under-
mined and, therefore, would agree that its interpretation of the statute
was incorrect. 24 2
This argument is not persuasive. Its flaw lies in the internal reductio,
in which the Court distorts the district court's argument. Only by doing
rio." For the structure of this argument, see infra notes 237-57 and accompany-
ing text.
237. In Mallard, the Attorney General argued that federal courts possess
the inherent authority "to require lawyers to serve." Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1823
(emphasis added). The power "to provide counsel for the indigent" has been
classified as inherent. 20 AM.JUR. 2D Courts § 79 (1965) (emphasis added). Con-
ceivably, a power to "provide" counsel might be consistent with the holding in
Mallard, but the question remains open.
238. Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1821 n.8. Unfortunately, the Court did not state
exactly what it took "respondent's reasoning" to be. At this point in the opin-
ion, the Court was addressing the argument that § 1915(d) conferred on federal
courts the authority to make coercive appointments of counsel. The district
court had also argued that federal courts have the inherent authority to appoint
counsel. Id. at 1823. Presumably, by "respondent's reasoning" the Court was
referring to this argument in the alternative. Arguing in the alternative is per-
mitted in federal court. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(2).
239. Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1821 n.8. The Court did not elaborate on this
cryptic conclusion. It is unclear how "respondent's reasoning" entailed the oti-
osity of § 1915(d). The only textual clue to the statement's meaning is found in
the sentence that preceded it. "[11f respondent's argument regarding the func-
tion of § 1915(d) were correct, it would seriously undermine respondent's asser-
tion that the federal courts possess inherent power to direct unwilling lawyers to
serve." Id. The reference to the district court's "argument regarding the func-
tion of § 1915(d)" presumably is meant to denote that it "confer[s] coercive
power upon the federal courts." Id. at 1821. For a construction of an argument
that would lead to the conclusion that § 1915(d) is otiose, see infra notes 250-54
and accompanying text.
240. Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1821 n.8. The force of this conclusion depends
on the implied premise that § 1915(d) is not otiose.
241. Id.
242. The same form of argument is used when one informs a child, "If you
eat a lot of sweets, your teeth will decay."
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'so does the "respondent's reasoning" render section 1915(d) "otiose."
The premise was that "statutory authorization is unnecessary for a court
simply to ask an attorney to represent someone." 243 This premise in-
volves three elements: authority, source of authority and action. A
faithful reading of the premise is that it concerns the last element, ac-
tion. In its reductio, however, the Court misconstrued the premise as
concerned with the second element, source of authority.
The district court had argued that interpreting request to mean ask
would render section 1915(d) a nullity.244 Its premise was that for this
type of action-asking-statutory authorization is not necessary. But
neither is inherent authority necessary, since asking is not the kind of
action that requires authority.245 Because no authority is involved, it is
meaningless to inquire after the source of authority. The argument is
that to read the statute as concerned with a type of action that does not
require authority is to render it a nullity, since under such an interpreta-
tion no authority-no statute-would be necessary. Therefore, the stat-
ute should be read as concerned with a type of action that does require
authority, namely, compelling.246
The Court, however, substituted for that premise, which concerns
the type of action, one that concerns the source of authority.247 Appar-
ently, the Court mistook the premise to be "any statute that codifies ex-
isting powers is unnecessary. '248 Only by attributing this proposition to
the district court was the Court able to engage in the internal reductio;
only under this interpretation of the premise could "respondent's rea-
soning" be alluded to as rendering section 1915(d) "otiose." By substi-
tuting its premise for the respondent's premise, the Court intimated that
"respondent's reasoning" was of the following form:249
(1) This action, coercive appointment of counsel, requires
authority.250
243. Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1821.
244. Id.
245. That authority, statutory or inherent, is unnecessary for a court to
"ask" something of an attorney may be made clearer by example. A judge
would not require authority to ask an attorney, "What time is it?" or "Should I
put mauve carpet in my chambers?".
246. Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1821 (respondent argued that § 1915(d) "must
be read to confer coercive power upon the federal courts.").
247. See id. at 1821. The Court stated that "[sitatutory provisions may sim-
ply codify existing rights or powers." This statement suggests a misunderstand-
ing of the district court's premise-asking does not require a right or power.
248. Id. That the Court's understanding of the premise was "any statute
that codifies existing powers is unnecessary" is implied by its assertion in re-
jecting the premise: "Statutory provisions may simply codify existing rights or
powers." Id.
249. The reasoning will be referred to in the text as the "otiose" argument.
250. Neither the Court nor the respondent questioned the truth of the
proposition that coercive appointment of counsel requires authority.
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(2) If there exists inherent authority for coercive appoint-
ment, then any statute that purports to confer authority
for coercive appointment is unnecessary.25'
(3) Either (a) there exists no inherent authority for coercive
appointment or (b) if such authority does exist, then sec-
tion 1915(d) should not be read as granting that
authority.2 52
(4) There exists inherent authority for coercive appoint-
ment.
255
(5) Thus, section 1915(d) should not be read as granting that
authority. It is otiose. 2M
From this point, it was a short step for the Court to complete the
internal reductio. The truth of the fourth premise entails conclusion
(5).255 But the district court would not want to assent to the conclusion.
Thus, it would not want to maintain that premise four is true. Or, as the
Court stated, "respondent would therefore have to conclude, it seems,
that the federal courts lacked inherent authority" for coercive appoint-
ment.2 56 In other words, the Court alleged to have proved that "if re-
spondent's argument regarding the function of section 1915(d) were
correct, it would seriously undermine [the] assertion that the federal
courts possess inherent authority to direct unwilling lawyers to
serve."
2 57
The establishment of that conditional conclusion was sufficient for
the Court to complete its primary reductio. For the respondent would
want to maintain that premise four is true; after all, it had argued that
251. The second premise in the line of reasoning derives from the Court's
substitution of its premise, "any statute that codifies existing powers is unneces-
sary," for that offered by the district court, "no power is needed simply to ask."
252. Premise (3)(b) follows from premise (2) and the implied premise that a
statute should not be read in a manner that renders it unnecessary. It should be
noted that premise (3) is an exclusive disjunction. Both (a) and (b) cannot be
true, because that would entail the contradiction "there exists and does not exist
inherent authority for coercive appointment of counsel."
253. The district court argued for inherent authority for coercive appoint-
ment. Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1823. Justice Brennan did not sanction that claim,
he simply assumed its truth for the purpose of this argument against the claim
that § 1915(d) granted the power.
254. The Court's reductio depended on proving that "if the federal courts
already had the authority to compel representation, then by respondents reason-
ing § 1915(d) would have been otiose." See id. at 1821 n.8. Therefore, for the
purpose of this stage of the argument, the Court presumed that premise (4) was
true. The truth of premise (4) entails the truth of premise (3)(b). The conclu-
sion follows from these two premises.
255. For a discussion of why premise (4) entails the conclusion (5), see
supra note 254.
256. Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1821 n.8.
257. Id. The establishment of this proposition completes the internal
reductio.
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courts do possess inherent authority to appoint counsel,2 58 and would
not want to "seriously undermine" its own argument. Therefore, it
would have to assent to the conclusion that its argument concerning the
function of the statute was incorrect. That is, it would have to accept
that section 1915(d) does not confer upon courts the power to appoint
counsel.259
This conclusion is incorrect. Unravelling the argument, the primary
redutio260 depended on the internal reductio,2 6 ' which depended on the
"otiose" argument, 26 2 which depended on the Court's substitution of its
premise2 63 for that advanced by the respondent. 264 As demonstrated
above, however, the Court was mistaken in substituting its premise for
the respondent's, since the Court's premise was concerned with source
of authority, while the respondent's was concerned with type of ac-
tion.26 5 Therefore, the conclusion of the primary reductio is not neces-
sary and section 1915(d), absent some other reason for not doing so,
could have been read to confer upon courts the power to appoint
counsel.
B. The Future
Underlying Mallard there were two relationships: the indigent liti-
gant's to Mallard, and Mallard's to the court. Because Mallard framed
his challenge as an action in mandamus, much of the Court's opinion
focused on the latter relationship. The decision probably will have its
greatest impact on questions of a court's power over those who practice
before it, and its implications on those questions are examined below.
But first the client-attorney relationship deserves attention.
1. Prisoner Suits
Mallard was appointed to represent inmates who sued prison offi-
cials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.266 Courts have held that civil rights ac-
258. Id. at 1823.
259. At this point, the Court has completed its primary reductio.
260. For a discussion of the primary reductio, see supra notes 229-59 and
accompanying text.
261. For a discussion of the internal reductio, see supra notes 236-57 and
accompanying text.
262. For a discussion of the "otiose" argument, see supra notes 250-54 and
accompanying text.
263. For a discussion of the Court's premise, see supra notes 247-49 and
accompanying text.
264. For a discussion of the respondent's premise, see supra notes 243-46
and accompanying text.
265. For a discussion of the impropriety of this substitution of premises,
see supra notes 243-49 and accompanying text.
266. Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1817. The prisoners' case involved three plain-
tiffs and eight defendants. Motion to Withdraw, Traman v. Parkin, No. 87-317-B
(S.D. Iowa 1987), reprinted in Joint Appendix at 5, Mallard (No. 87-1490).
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tions, as well as habeas corpus actions, are civil proceedings. 267 With
rare exception,268 the Court is adamant that civil litigants have neither a
right to counsel26 9 nor a right of access to courts, through the assertion
of which they may avoid the standard costs of litigation. 270 In Bounds v.
Smith,271 however, the Court held that prisoners have a right of "mean-
ingful access" to the courts. 272 It is not clear whether this right derives
from the due process clause 273 or from the equal protection clause.274
What is clear, though, is that for indigent prisoners pursuing post-con-
viction section 1983 actions, the right to meaningful access does not
equate with a right to appointed counsel. 275
Arguably, this is as it should be, for the following reason. So long
as a person faces prosecution by the state, he is entitled to certain pro-
tections. But when he assumes the role of plaintiff, there is nothing
about his status of "one previously prosecuted," or even "one con-
victed," that entitles him to more than the usual civil plaintiff. The ABA
endorses this view: "Prisoners should have access to legal advice and
counseling, and, in appropriate circumstances, will have a right to coun-
sel, in connection with ... civil matters, to the same extent as provided
to members of the general public who are financially unable to obtain
adequate representation. 276 Thus, the argument goes, since the usual
civil plaintiff does not have a right to appointed counsel simply because
267. See, e.g., Cookish v. Cunningham, 787 F.2d 1 (Ist Cir. 1986); Young v.
Zant, 727 F.2d 1489 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1009 (1985); United
States ex rel. Wissenfeld v. Wilkins, 281 F.2d 707 (2d Cir. 1960); Dorsey v. Gill,
148 F.2d 857 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 890 (1945); Emory v. Duckworth,
555 F. Supp. 985 (N.D. Ind. 1983).
268. See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (due process required
access to court for indigent civil litigant seeking divorce); see also Little v.
Streater, 452 U.S. 1 (1981) (in "quasi-criminal" paternity action, defendant enti-
tled to state-subsidized blood-grouping tests); cf. Meltzer v. LeCraw & Co., 402
U.S. 954 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that Boddie should extend to all
civil cases).
269. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18 (1981)
(no right to counsel for parent as respondent in action to terminate parental
rights).
270. See Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973) (no right of access for
review of welfare benefit termination); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434
(1973) (no right of access in bankruptcy proceedings).
271. 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
272. Id. at 828. The right may be satisfied either by access to an adequate
law library or by adequate assistance from persons with legal training.
273. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 419 (1974), overruled on other
grounds, Thornburgh v. Abbott, 109 S. Ct. 1874, 1881 (1989).
274. See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 557 (1987).
275. Id. (no right to counsel in post-conviction § 1983 proceedings insti-
tuted by indigent inmates); see also Murray v. Giarratano, 109 S. Ct. 2765 (1989)
(Finley rule applies to death row inmates).
276. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: LEGAL STATUS OF PRISONERS Stan-
dard 23-2.2(a)(iv) (1981).
1990] NOTE 1225
51
Springer: Mallard v. United States District Court: Attorney May Refuse Fede
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1990
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 35: p. 1175
she cannot afford to pay her own, neither should a prisoner who insti-
tutes a civil action.
The flaw in this argument is apparent. It suggests that imprisoned
plaintiffs are on equal footing with other litigants, and that their asser-
tion of a right to counsel is somehow overreaching. But as many
problems as the indigent litigant faces, the imprisoned indigent litigant
faces more. 277 Not only does physical confinement impair the ability to
litigate effectively, but in addition a prisoner often faces legal hurdles
that the usual plaintiff does not.278 Far from overreaching, then, many
prisoners struggle simply to reach the level of the nonimprisoned liti-
gant. In recognition of these disabilities, Congress has in some in-
stances provided relief.2 79
Despite the flaws in the argument against a prisoner's right to coun-
sel in civil actions, Mallard should not defeat many prisoners' expecta-
tions. Recent statistics indicate that prisoner suits account for almost
eighteen percent of all civil cases commenced in federal court.2 8 0 Over
sixty percent of the prisoner suits are civil rights actions, in which a
court's authority to appoint and pay counsel is narrowest. 28 ' Abuse of
the system by individual prisoners has resulted in an understandable re-
luctance to expose the courts to an even greater number of such
277. See, e.g., Mello, Facing Death Alone: The Post-Conviction Attorney Crisis on
Death Row, 37 AM. U.L. REV. 513 (1988); Turner, When Prisoners Sue: A Study of
Prisoner Section 1983 Suits in the Federal Courts, 92 HARV. L. REV. 610 (1979); Note,
Discretionary Appointment of Counsel at Post-Conviction Proceedings: An Unconstitutional
Barrier to Effective Post-Conviction Relief, 8 GA. L. REV. 434 (1974).
278. See, e.g., Thornburgh v. Abbott, 109 S. Ct. 1874 (1989) (applying "rea-
sonableness" scrutiny to first amendment challenge to interference with publica-
tions received by mail); Kentucky Dept. of Corrections v. Thompson, 109 S. Ct.
1904 (1989) (no due process liberty interest implicated in restrictions on visi-
tors); O'Lone v. Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987) ("reasonableness" scrutiny ap-
plied to free exercise challenge); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987)
("reasonableness" scrutiny applied to challenge to interference with prisoner
correspondence).
279. See Criminal Justice Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-447, 84 Stat. 916
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1988)). The Act provides for free representa-
tion in some post-conviction proceedings, including habeas corpus (28 U.S.C.
§§ 2241, 2254) and a motion to vacate sentence (28 U.S.C. § 2255). See also
Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat.
2641 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988)) (providing compensation for success-
ful § 1983 litigants).
280. In the twelve months ending June 30, 1989, 233,293 civil cases were
commenced in federal court. 1988 ADMIN. OFF. U.S. CTS. ANN. REP. app. I at 20
(1989) [hereinafter ANNUAL REPORT]. Of that number, 41,390, or 17.7%, were
prisoner suits. Id. at 23. In 1989, .26% of the American population was incar-
cerated, up from .096% in 1970. Moss, Drug Cases Clog the Courts, A.B.A.J., Apr.
1990, at 34.
281. Of the 41,390 prisoner petitions filed in the 12 months ending June
30, 1989, 25,905, or 62.6%, were civil rights actions. ANNUAL REPORT, supra
note 280, at 23. Habeas corpus petitions accounted for 12,343, or 29.8%, of the
total. Id.
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suits. 28 2 Prisoners are not oblivious to this reluctance. As one self-help
manual written for imprisoned litigants states:
Even though you do not have a constitutional right to have
counsel appointed in a civil action, it is recommended that all
pro se litigants seek appointment of counsel.
When you file your motion for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis, you should file a motion for appointment of counsel
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d).
... However, the court has no authority to order an attor-
ney to represent you, or-more important-to pay an attorney
to represent you.285
It seems safe to conclude, then, that although an opposite outcome in
Mallard might have left prisoners better off then they were before the
decision, the actual result will leave them no worse off.
The Court may have acted not out of a desire to leave prisoners no
better off, but rather out of concern that an opposite decision would
spell potential disaster for the federal court system. Already, prisoner
suits account for a substantial percentage of actions in federal court. 284
Recognition of a right to counsel in collateral post-conviction proceed-
ings would remove one of the few disincentives to filing suit that prison-
ers have. In addition, our nation's fervent "war on drugs," quite apart
from its other ill-effects, 28 5 can only lead to an increased strain on the
courts. The Federal Courts Study Committee 28 6 recognized that one of
282. See Graham v. Riddle, 554 F.2d 133 (4th Cir. 1977) (affirming order
that conditioned plaintiff's right to file in forma pauperis upon "good cause
shown" where plaintiff had filed "plethora of frivolous, repetitive complaints");
Carter v. Telectron, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 944 (S.D. Tex. 1977) (plaintiff who filed
178 cases in 15 years subject to "All Writs" statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, condition-
ing right to file every future action); Green v. Wyrick, 428 F. Supp. 732 (W.D.
Mo. 1976) (prisoner enjoined from future filings on behalf of fellow inmates),
aff'd sub nom. In re Green, 586 F.2d 1247 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 922
(1979).
283. D. MANVILLE, PRISONERS' SELF-HELP LITIGATION MANUAL 232 (rev. 2d
ed. 1983) (citations omitted); cf J. GOBERT & N. COHEN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS
§ 2.04, at 33 (1981 & Supp. 1989) (stating "§ 1915 provides authority for the
appointment of counsel in civil . . . cases involving indigents"). The latter
source should be read as concerned with the attorney-court aspect of Mallard,
rather than the attorney-client aspect, since the authors also state that
"[a]ppointment generally is held to lie within the sound discretion of the court."
Id. at 32.
284. For the statistics on prisoner suits, see supra notes 280-81 and accom-
panying text.
285. See, e.g., National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 109 S. Ct.
1384 (1989) (upholding Customs Service's drug-testing program which included
warrantless urinalysis despite absence of individualized suspicion of drug use).
286. See Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-
702, §§ 101-09, 102 Stat. 4642, 4644-45 (1988) (establishing committee). Con-
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the effects was increased prosecution of drug cases in federal courts; 28 7
its recommendation urged Congress to refocus federal drug enforce-
ment strategy by limiting federal prosecutions to cases that state courts
could not effectively handle.288 But no matter which courts the cases
are prosecuted in, the consequence of increased prosecution has been a
startling increase in prison population-in the first six months of 1989,
the number of state and federal prisoners grew at a rate of almost 1800
per week. 2 8
9
More people in prison will inevitably lead to more prisoner suits.
Aside from the increased tensions associated with overcrowding, 29° the
mere institutional structure of the prison system invites litigation. To
the incarcerated, the prison represents nearly everyone against whom a
cause of action might exist in ordinary life, e.g., health-care provider,
employer, police, landlord, restaurant, etc. 291 Moreover, section 1983
provides the ideal means for asserting the action.292 The development
of constitutional law since 1871, when Congress enacted what is now
section 1983 to combat the Ku Klux Klan,2 93 has resulted in "an aston-
ishing spectrum of governmental conduct [that] give[s] rise to at least a
gress established the committee to study the federal court system, its role, its
workload, its structure and its relationship with the state courts.
287. During the 1980s, federal drug prosecutions increased 280%. Moss,
supra note 280, at 34.
288. REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMrrEE 35 (1990) [herein-
after FEDERAL COURTS STUDY]. Assistant Attorney General Edward Dennis and
Representative Carlos Moorehead strongly opposed the suggestion to move
drug cases to state courts, arguing for the necessity of a prominent federal role
in the war on drugs. Id. at 38. Attorney General Thornburgh advanced a similar
argument during hearings on the committee's tentative proposals. See Sweeping
Changes Recommended by Federal Courts Study Committee, 58 U.S.L.W. 2442, 2443
(Feb. 6, 1990).
289. Moss, supra note 280, at 34. Prison population increased 7.3% in the
first six months of 1989, exceeding all previously recorded annual rates. Id.
290. In April 1990, 43 states were under court order to reduce overcrowd-
ing. Id.; cf Tillery v. Owens, 907 F.2d 418 (3d Cir. 1990) ("double-ceiling" in
response to overcrowding violative of eighth amendment).
291. This peculiar feature of prisoner suits was pointed out in an interview
on March 9, 1990, with Judge Garrett E. Brown, Jr., United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey.
292. Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). The Supreme Court has created an analogous right of
action against individuals who act under federal law. See Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
293. Civil Rights Act of 1871, tit. xxiv, § 1979 (also known as Ku Klux Klan
1228 [Vol. 35: p. 1175
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colorable claim that substantive or process rights protected by the Con-
stitution have been violated."'294
It is beyond the scope of this Note to do so, but eventually either
Congress or the judicial system will have to develop a response to the
increased number of suits. Some methods are in place. Under a 1979
amendment to the Federal Magistrates Act,29 5 magistrates enjoy some
post-conviction motion jurisdiction.2 96 The Federal Courts Study Com-
mittee has recommended that Congress stiffen the statutory require-
ment of exhaustion of state administrative remedies in state prisoner
section 1983 cases. 29 7 Another possible approach deserves attention:
instituting procedures to assist article III courts in handling section
1983 prisoner suits. 29 8
This approach is promising but also troublesome. Federal courts
could establish a system of court-annexed arbitration to resolve dis-
puted factual issues in section 1983 prisoner suits, thus "packaging" the
case for speedier disposition by the court.29 9 Congress has already con-
doned the use of court-annexed arbitration in twenty district courts,30 0
and the Federal Courts Study Committee has recommended that Con-
gress broaden the use of the procedure.3so At the same time, however,
Congress exempted from arbitration any "action based on an alleged
violation of a right secured by the Constitution" unless both parties con-
294. R. CASS & C. DIVER, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 814
(1987).
295. 28 U.S.C. §§ 604, 631-39 (1988); 18 U.S.C. §§ 3060, 3401 (1988).
296. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l)(B) (1988); cf. Silberman, Masters and Magistrates
Part II: The American Analogue, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1297, 1349 (1975) (recom-
mending changes that were adopted in 1979 amendment).
297. See FEDERAL COURTS STUDY, supra note 288, at 48. The committee has
recommended that Congress delete the requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(b),
under which exhaustion is required only if the United States Attorney General
or a federal court has certified as adequate the state prison's administrative
remedy.
298. Another approach may well be underway, at least in other contexts of
prisoner litigation: decisions that curtail prisoners' access to federal courts. See
Saffle v. Parks, 110 S. Ct. 1257 (death row inmates who claim conviction violated
rights not entitled to benefit from changes in law while their cases are pending),
reh'g demied, 110 S. Ct. 1940 (1990); Bulter v. McKellar, 110 S. Ct. 1212 (1990)
(same); Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989) (state prisoners cannot use fed-
eral habeas corpus to make new federal law unless proposed new rule pertains to
"bedrock" constitutional rights).
299. As one commentator has pointed out, such a procedure would not
amount to a pure form of arbitration if the decision is non-binding. See Perritt,
"And the Whole Earth Was of One Language"--A Broad View of Dispute Resolution, 29
VILL. L. REV. 1221, 1231, 1305 n.426 (1983-84). Professor Perritt's article pro-
vides a detailed conceptual framework for thinking about alternative dispute
resolution.
300. See Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-
702, § 901(a), 102 Stat. 4642, 4662 (1988) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 658).
301. See FEDERAL COURTS STUDY, supra note 288, at 83.
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sent to it.s0 2 In other words, most prisoner section 1983 actions would
require consent.3 0 3 The Eastern District of Pennsylvania has eliminated
any doubt of the requirement by explicitly excluding prisoner civil rights
cases from its compulsory arbitration program.3s 4
Why exclude prisoner section 1983 suits from the arbitration pro-
cess? In addition to the exclusion of constitutional cases from arbitra-
tion, Congress has directed district courts to establish procedures for
exempting from the process any case "in which the objectives of arbitra-
tion would not be realized (1) because the case involves complex or
novel legal issues, (2) because legal issues predominate over factual is-
sues, or (3) for other good cause." °3 0 5 It is probably true that most con-
stitutional litigation satisfies either of the first two conditions, thereby
supporting a blanket exclusion of constitutional cases from mandatory
arbitration. But it is less clear that prisoner section 1983 cases do so;
generally, the legal issues are clear enough and only the facts are con-
tested. Thus, if there is any justification for excluding the suits from the
arbitration process, it must arise from the "for other good cause"
exception.
That vague language supplies the ideal release valve by which the
political process accommodates competing interests. There is, or
should be, a strong social interest in securing a level of decency below
which we will not tolerate prisons subjecting the increasing number of
persons they house. It is this interest that section 1983 suits serve so
well. But there is also a social interest in the maintenance of a function-
ing federal court system. It is this interest that the already high, and
likely to increase, number of section 1983 suits threatens to cripple. By
not expanding prisoners' access to courts, Mallard postponed the show-
down between these two interests. But the legal community should pre-
pare for it.
2. Courts' Inherent Authority to Appoint Counsel
Because Mallard has foreclosed reliance on section 1915(d) for the
authority to appoint counsel, federal courts will have to appeal to some
other source of authority if they are to continue supplying counsel to
indigent litigants. A court that attempts to appoint counsel in the future
will most likely appeal to its "inherent power" to do so. If an attorney
302. Judicial Improvements and Access to justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702,
§ 901(a), 102 Stat. 4642, 4660 (1988) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 652(b)(1)).
303. For a discussion of the relationship among prisoners' grievances,
§ 1983 and constitutional rights, see supra notes 292-94 and accompanying text.
304. See R. U.S. DIST. CT. E. DIST. PA. Rule 8.3.A. (1990). The procedure
instructs the clerk to refer to compulsory arbitration all civil cases in which
money damages only (less than $100,000) are sought, but excludes social secur-
ity cases and prisoners' civil rights cases.
305. Judicial Improvements and Access to justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702,
§ 901(a), 102 Stat. 4642, 4660 (1988) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 652(c)).
1230 [Vol. 35: p. 1175
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were to challenge the appointment, it is not clear how the case would
come out. Mallard does not provide much guidance; the Court decided
to "leave that issue for another day." 30° Further, as one court has
noted, the notion of inherent authority is nebulous and its boundaries
are shadowy.307 Before exploring the possibilities, therefore, it is neces-
sary to examine the idea of inherent authority.
a. The Idea of Inherent Powers
Statutes, including the federal rules of procedure,308 are the clear-
est source of a court's power. 3°9 These sources do not, however, com-
pletely exhaust the scope of the district courts' powers.310 There also
exists what courts commonly refer to as "inherent"3 1' or "supervi-
sory"3 1 2 power. While there is no doubt about the existence of this
power, delineating its content has proved notoriously difficult.313 Not-
ing that "conceptual and definitional problems regarding inherent
power... have bedeviled commentators for years,"1314 the Third Circuit
has undertaken an analysis of the notion of federal courts' inherent
power.
In Eash v. Rggins Trucking Inc. ,31 the court identified three catego-
306. See Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1823.
307. See Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 561 (3d Cir. 1985).
308. Although the Court promulgates the rules, it does so pursuant to stat-
utory authority. See 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1988) (rule-making power generally).
309. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1988) (contempt power); FED. R. CRIM. PRO.
42 (contempt power); FED. R. Civ. PRO. 11 (power to sanction parties for papers
filed in bad faith); id. Rule 16 (power to direct pretrial conference); id. Rule 37
(power to sanction parties for failure to cooperate in discovery).
310. See, e.g., Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 630 (1962); Michaelson v.
Uriited States, 266 U.S. 42, 65 (1924); Exparte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505,
510 (1874); Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 227 (1821); United
States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812); G. Heileman
Brewing Co. v. Joseph Oat Corp., 871 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc);
Halaco Eng'g Co. v. Costle, 843 F.2d 376, 380 (9th Cir. 1988); Eash, 757 F.2d at
561.
311. See, e.g., Link, 370 U.S. at 630.
312. See, e.g., Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 109 S. Ct. 2218
(1989); Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 254-55 (1988); cf.
Schwartz, The Exercise of Supervisory Power by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, 27
VILL. L. REV. 506 (1982).
313. See Heileman Brewing, 871 F.2d 648. The Seventh Circuit faced the is-
sue whether a district court has the authority to order a litigant, and not just its
attorney, to appear in a pretrial conference and to impose sanctions for failure
to comply. In holding that the court did have the authority, this 6-5 decision
produced six different opinions.
314. Eash, 757 F.2d at 561. The court attributed the conceptual problems
to two sources. First, because federal courts do not often resort to their inher-
ent powers, and because when they do they are not often challenged, few cases
discuss the topic. Id. Second, when they do address the topic, courts use the
one generic term, inherent power, to describe various distinguishable powers. Id.
at 562.
315. 757 F.2d 557 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc) (district court has power to
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ries of usage of the term inherent power. The first, and narrowest, cate-
gory the court named "irreducible inherent authority."3 16 In this
category are powers, derived from article III, that are "fundamental to
the essence of a court as a constitutional tribunal. 3 1 7 The second cate-
gory encompasses what the court referred to as "necessary" powers.318
The category of necessary powers is the broadest and includes the con-
tempt power.319 The third category consists of what the court alluded
to as "highly useful" powers.3 20 In this category of highly useful powers
the court included general equitable powers.32'
Problems arise when the two sources of power, statutory and inher-
ent, arguably prescribe different results. According to the Eash court, a
court's ability to exercise an inherent power in an area addressed by
legislation depends on the category to which the power belongs. Within
the domain of the first category, or irreducible inherent authority,
"courts may act notwithstanding contrary legislative direction. '3 22 Nec-
essary powers, the secondary category, " 'may be regulated within limits
not precisely defined,' ... [but] can 'neither be abrogated nor rendered
practically inoperative' " by legislation.3 23 A court may invoke the
highly useful powers of the third category, by contrast, "only in the ab-
order attorney to pay to government cost of impanelling jury for one day as
sanction for attorney's abuse of judicial process), overruling Gamble v. Pope &
Talbot, Inc., 307 F.2d 729 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 888 (1962).
316. Id. at 562.
317. Id. (citing United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147 (1872);
Frankfurter & Landis, Power of Congress over Procedure in Criminal Contempts in "In-
ferior" Federal Courts-A Study in Separation of Powers, 37 HARV. L. REV. 1010, 1023
(1924); Levin & Amsterdam, Legislative Control over Judicial Rule-Making: A Problem
of Constitutional Revision, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 30-33 (1958)).
318. Id. The term necessary derives from the Supreme Court's early pro-
nouncement that a court's inherent powers are those "necessary to the exercise
of all others." United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34
(1812); see also Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980) (quot-
ing Hudson). The Eash court cited both cases in support of its recognition of this
second category. Eash, 757 F.2d at 562. Alternatively, these might be named
"essential" powers. See id. at 563 (citing Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610,
616 (1959); Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 539 (1925); Michaelson v.
United States, 266 U.S. 42, 65 (1924); Myers v. United States, 264 U.S. 95, 103
(1924)).
319. Eash, 757 F.2d at 562.
320. Id. at 563 (citing Exparte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312 (1920); Ruiz v.
Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115, 1161 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1042 (1983);
Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855, 865 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
833 (1956)).
321. Id. (citing Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. 1, 5 (1973); ITT Community Dev.
Corp. v. Barton, 569 F.2d 1351, 1359 (5th Cir. 1978); Johnston v. Marsh, 227
F.2d 528, 531 (3d Cir. 1955)).
322. Id. at 562. Because the first category is rooted in the concept of sepa-
ration of powers, within its domain the judiciary is free from legislative
interference.
323. Id. at 563 (quoting Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42, 66
(1924)).
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sence of contrary legislative direction."'324
b. The Inherent Power to Appoint Attorneys
Where in this framework should one place a court's invocation of
inherent power to appoint an attorney? Although the Eash court ad-
dressed the issue of sanctioning an attorney for misconduct, its analysis
suggests that the proper category in the case of appointment is that of
"highly useful" powers. It would not be the first category, for it is diffi-
cult to imagine an argument that article III speaks to the issue, or that
there is anything about unrepresented indigents that threatens the es-
sence of a court as a constitutional tribunal. Likewise, one could not
seriously maintain that a court's power to appoint an attorney is neces-
sary to the exercise of all its other powers, which is the distinguishing
feature of powers contained in the second category. By elimination,
then, only the third category remains.
In addition, there is a positive argument for placing the power to
appoint an attorney in the third category. Eash addressed a court's
power to impose sanctions for attorney misconduct. The court de-
scribed the misconduct involved as an "unjustified failure to discharge
an administrative responsibility as an officer of the court"3 2 5 and as
"conduct unbecoming a member of the bar." 32 6 In holding that district
courts have inherent power to sanction an attorney for such misconduct,
the Eash court used the limiting language "in the absence of contrary
legislation"3 2 7 and "absent a statute or rule... to the contrary."13 28 In
light of the relationship between inherent powers and legislation, 32 9 this
language indicates that the power falls under the category of highly use-
ful powers. Assuming that there is some relation between the relevant
category of power and the subject matter over which the power is exer-
cised, it follows that any power that concerns an attorney's responsibility
as an officer of the court or as a member of the bar should fall into the
third category of inherent powers. Because an attorney's responsibility
to represent the indigent arguably arises both from her relationship to
324. Id. (citing Alyeska Pipeline Serv. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240,
259 (1975) and Williams, The Source of Authority for Rules of Court Affecting Procedure,
22 WASH. U.L.Q 459, 473 (1937)). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure sug-
gest this restriction on inherent powers. See FED. R. Civ. PRO. 83 ("In all cases
not provided for by rule, the district judges and magistrates may regulate their
practice in any manner not inconsistent with these rules or those of the district in
which they act.") (emphasis added); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2071 (1988) (courts may
establish rules, but rules must be "consistent with Acts of Congress and rules of
practice and procedure prescribed by the Supreme Court").
325. Eash, 757 F.2d at 566.
326. Id. at 566, 569.
327. Id. at 564.
328. Id. at 569.
329. For a statement of the relationship between legislation and the third
category of inherent power, see supra note 324 and accompanying text.
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the court and from her membership in the bar, the court's inherent
power with respect to this responsibility falls within the third category.
Recall that a court may invoke the third category of its inherent
powers "only in the absence of contrary legislative direction."3 3 0 Sup-
pose, then, that a court invokes its inherent power to appoint an attor-
ney to represent an indigent. If the attorney challenges the
appointment, he may argue that section 1915(d), as interpreted by Mal-
lard, amounts to the contrary legislative direction in the face of which the
court has no inherent power. That is, future debate will center on
whether Mallard stands for either (1) the proposition, 'Section 1915(d) is
not a legislative expression in favor of appointment,' or (2) the proposi-
tion, 'Section 1915(d) is a legislative expression against appointment.'
The appointing court will advance the first interpretation, while the at-
torney challenging the appointment will stress the second. 3 '
IV. CONCLUSION
The fundamental problem in Mallard and similar cases is how our
society should reconcile its ideal that access to justice should not depend
on financial status with its ideal of liberty. The solution reached in the
case was correct, even if the Court's way of reaching the solution was
less than persuasive. To those unconvinced by the Court's reasoning,
one can only say that the judicial constructions of "plain meaning" and
"legislative intent," as incoherent as they may prove under close analy-
sis,332 are nevertheless so much a part of our tradition that it is unlikely
courts will abandon them anytime soon. The limits of our language are
such that one can always expose weaknesses and inconsistencies in any
written text, including judicial opinions. While there is some pleasure in
330. For a discussion of the conditions under which a court may invoke the
third category of inherent powers, see supra note 324 and accompanying text.
331. It is too soon to decide which interpretation will win out. For exam-
ple, one federal court, faced with an attorney's violation of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11, sanctioned the attorney by ordering that he undertake pro bono a
case from a list of pro se litigants. Bleckner v. General Accident Ins. Co., 713 F.
Supp. 642 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). The court cited Mallard in acknowledging that 28
U.S.C. § 1915(d) did not give it the authority to impose the sanction, yet imme-
diately referred to justice Stevens's dissent with a "but cf id." cite. Id. at 653 n.4.
It is not clear if the court did so in order to cast doubt on the majority opinion,
or to refer to Justice Stevens's discussion of inherent powers.
Justice Blackmun recently stated that Mallard is not contrary to the proposi-
tion that attorneys, as officers of the court, have a duty to serve the public by
representing indigent litigants. F.T.C. v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n,
110 S. Ct. 768, 791 & n.* (1990) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part).
332. For a discussion of the problems arising from the "plain meaning"
approach, see supra note 189 and accompanying text. With regard to the
problems with the "legislative intent" strategy, see R. DWORKIN, supra note 167,
at 311-27.
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that exercise, it is ultimately unproductive. The importance of an opin-
ion lies not in how well constructed it is, but in its practical effects.
Mallard does not emasculate the ideal that access to justice should
not depend on financial status. Section 1915(d) will continue to be a
useful element of an indigent litigant's resources.333 It can be read as
relieving a litigant of all non-attorney fee expenses of litigation.
Granted, attorney fees often comprise the largest portion of the cost of
litigation, but court costs and fees may also be substantial, particularly
for the less well-off litigant. In addition, an attorney may be appointed
under another statute, and there is no bar to proceeding under section
1915(d) with an appointed attorney. Some attorneys may be more likely
to volunteer their services if they know that they will not be responsible
for as many out-of-pocket expenses.33 4
By contrast, an opposite outcome in the case would have greatly
thwarted the ideal of liberty. Moreover, the actual result does not entail
that lawyers must adopt a mean-spirited, selfish self-image. Mallard con-
cerned an issue much narrower than an attorney's ethical obligation to
provide pro bono services. That broad issue constitutes the general
context in which the case arose, but it would do well to specify its exact
position within the larger framework. Only under the narrowest defini-
tion of the term could the case be said strictly to involve a "pro bono
obligation."3 3 5 The pro bono obligation as defined by the ABA may be
satisfied in more ways than one.336 The Court was correct to read sec-
tion 1915(d) as not limiting an attorney's options to one. The reality of
333. See United States v. 30.64 Acres of Land, 795 F.2d 796 (9th Cir. 1986).
Judge Wiggins, writing for the court, stated: "As a practical matter, we observe
that the lack of court power to make mandatory assignments should not reduce
the availability of counsel to needful indigent civil litigants under section
1915(d)." Id. at 803.
334. Some courts have recognized the need for incentives to perform pub-
lic interest work. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the en-
hancement of an attorney fee award in a Title VII action by 25%, despite the fact
that the attorneys in the case worked for a non-profit organization. See McKen-
zie v. Kennickell, 875 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1989). The court stated that
"[f]ar from constituting 'economic relief' or a 'windfall' to non-profit firms, the
equal availability of contingency enhancements creates a level playing field." Id.
at 334.
335. See Christensen, supra note 19, at 2-3. Christensen devoted a whole
section of his work to "Some Definitional Problems." Id In his view,
The narrowest definition-actual representation of needy clients-
would appear to be too restrictive.... Of course, there is something to
be said for the position that the public, the profession, and the individ-
ual lawyer would all benefit significantly if all lawyers were to devote at
least some of their public service time to the performance of their quin-
tessential role-the actual representation of clients-in the cause of the
defenseless and oppressed. But perhaps this would best be left as an
ideal rather than as a definition of the pro bono obligation.
Id.
336. For a discussion of the ways in which an attorney may satisfy the pro
bono obligation, see supra note 27 and accompanying text.
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today's profession does not support such a narrow approach. 3 "7
Of course, the legal profession is not the touchstone of every at-
tempt to solve social problems--one could as easily say that the reality
of the poor's needs does support a narrow approach. But the breakdown
of homogeneity within the profession will have other consequences
which lawyers may perceive as less self-serving and which will benefit the
poor. The most notable consequence is the recognition that perhaps
some legal services can be delivered by nonlawyers.3 3 8 As horrifying as
that prospect may appear to some attorneys, at least it advances the goal
of increased access to the judicial system without conscripting lawyers.
A continuing and increasing articulation of the profession's ethical
obligation,3 3 9 and a willingness on the part of the members to strive to
meet those obligations, would do more to satisfy both the ideal of liberty
and of justice than would a system of coercive appointment enforced by
legal sanctions. The proper approach is to continue to rely on attor-
neys' voluntary acceptance of their share of the burden. Already lawyers
do more than other professions to meet the needs of the indigent.3 40 As
long as attorneys recognize that their "duties go beyond what the law
demands [will ours] remain a noble profession."13 4 1
Fred Springer*
337. For a discussion of how the changes in the legal profession support
the Court's result, see supra notes 207-15 and accompanying text.
338. See California Is Poised to Let Paralegals Go It Alone, N.Y. Times, Oct. 12,
1990, at B5, col. 1. A commission appointed by the California State Bar has pro-
posed that independent paralegals (not affiliated with a law firm) be permitted to
ractice in such areas as divorce, landlord-tenant and personal bankruptcy. The
ar "is acting in part to stymie a more permissive plan being studied in the Cali-
fornia Legislature." Id. The article notes: "Consumer advocates maintain that
many routine legal chores ... do not require a lawyer's costly services and that
such tasks can be performed by paralegals . . .who charge much less. Some
lawyers' groups are beginning to agree, especially as they feel pressure from the
courts to provide low-cost representation." Id. One California state senator has
warned, "[Lawyers] better get out front and try to help and quit stone-
walling .... One way or the other, there is going to be some movement in the
direction of paralegals doing this kind of work." Id.
339. For a discussion of the recent articulation of an attorney's ethical obli-
gations, see supra notes 29-39 and accompanying text.
340. See J. KULTGEN, ETHICS AND PROFESSIONALISM 125 (1988). Professor
Kultgen suggests that "most [professional ethical] codes ignore the matter of
the needs of the indigent." Id. He states, however, that the ABA "comes closest
to attacking the issue of ability to pay head on," and that "[tihe ABA's concern is
unusual among professions." Id.
341. Mallard, 109 S. Ct. at 1823 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
* For their contributions to this Note, I am grateful to the following mem-
bers of the Villanova University School of Law: Rob Dugan, Professor Catherine
Lanctot, Jim McHugh, Scott Price and Susan Straka. Special thanks to Maria
Morales of the University of Pennsylvania graduate department of philosophy.
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